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I. INTRODUCTION
In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court decided four prominent (groups of) cases involving race. On
each occasion, the civil rights claim won in some significant sense.
One set of cases involved so-called peonage legislation-laws that
coerced (primarily) black labor. In Bailey v. Alabama,1 the Court
invalidated under the federal Peonage Act of 18672 and the Thirteenth
Amendment an Alabama law making it a crime to enter, with fraudu-
lent intent, into a labor contract that provided for advance payment of
wages; the law made breach of the contract prima facie evidence of
* Professor of Law and F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil Liberties and
Human Rights, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Barry Cushman and Steve Siegel for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Jason Cary and Joe Palmore provided outstanding
research assistance. Anyone working in this area must acknowledge, as I gratefully do, the
pathbreaking research of Benno Schmidt, Jr.
1. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-153, Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
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fraudulent intent, and Alabama evidence law did not permit laborers
to rebut that presumption with their own testimony. Similarly, in
United States v. Reynolds the Court struck down under the
Thirteenth Amendment and the 1867 Peonage Act an Alabama law
that criminalized breach of surety agreements under which private
parties paid the costs and fines necessary to liberate convicted crimi-
nals from jail in exchange for promises to labor for a specified time.3
Second, the Court in McCabe v. Atchison, Topekhz & Santa Fe
Railway Co.4 ruled that an Oklahoma law permitting railroads to
exclude blacks from first class accommodations, rather than providing
separate but equal facilities, violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
notwithstanding the disparate per capita demand for such
accommodations among the races. Third, the Court in Guinn v.
Oklahoma5 and Myers v. Anderson6 invalidated under the Fifteenth
Amendment grandfather clauses which had protected illiterate whites
from disfranchisement by exempting from literacy tests those persons
who were enfranchised in the mid-1860s (before southern blacks
received the right to vote) or who were descended from such persons.
Finally, in Buchanan v. Warley the Court invalidated a Louisville,
Kentucky, ordinance that segregated neighborhood blocks by race.7
My goal in this Article is to "contextualize" these Progressive
era race cases. That is, I seek to situate these decisions within the
broader social, political, economic, and ideological context within
which the Supreme Court Justices operated.8 This effort is part of a
larger project of mine, which has been to contextualize twentieth-
century constitutional history. In previous articles I have endeavored
to understand both Brown v. Board of Education9 specifically and the
post-War civil rights and civil liberties revolutions generally in terms
of the background extralegal forces that rendered those decisions
possible.10 Here I shall simply sketch the contours of this approach to
constitutional history.
3. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
4. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
5. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
6. 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
7. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
8. I regard this Article as a preliminary effort. The material in it ultimately will com-
prise parts of two chapters in a book, provisionally entitled From Plessy to Brown and Beyond:
The Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Rethinking]; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) [hereinafter Kiarman, Brown].
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The basic premise of this contextualist method is that Supreme
Court Justices are part of contemporary culture. As such, they are
unlikely to try to coerce the nation into adopting policies that a sub-
stantial majority opposes. It is mistaken, I think, to understand this
phenomenon primarily in terms of political checks that operate upon
the Court, though it is true that the Justices are not impervious to
political pressure. Rather, the point is more one of countermajori-
tarian inclination than capacity: The Justices rarely resist a strong
majoritarian impulse because their values are likely to reflect those of
the majority.1 The general indeterminacy of the constitutional text
enhances the likelihood that the Justices' constitutional interpreta-
tions will reflect the values of contemporary society,12 though plenty of
examples exist to suggest that even relatively determinate text usu-
ally fails to constrain the Court from injecting contemporary norms
into the Constitution. 3 That the Court's constitutional interpreta-
tions reflect broad shifts in public opinion seems difficult to deny.
Consider, for example, the volte-face in race relations jurisprudence
between Plessy v. Ferguson4 and Brown, 5 the sudden acknowledg-
ment that the Equal Protection Clause protected women in the wake
of the burgeoning women's movement,16 the Court's dramatic shift on
gay rights issues between Bowers v. Hardwick7 and Romer v. Evans,'
the timing of Roe v. Wade,19 the Court's invalidation of school prayer
in the wake of the post-World War II collapse of the nation's unofficial
Protestant establishment, 20 and the Court's tentative moves toward
11. See, e.g., ROBERT McCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 209 (2d ed. 1994);
Kiarman, Rethinking, supra note 10, at 16 & n.72; Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1881, 1925-26 (1991).
12. For numerous examples of this textual indeterminacy, see Michael J. Kiarman,
Fidelity, Indeterminacy and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739
(1997).
13. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (interpreting the Fifth
Amendment to have an equal protection component, thus enabling the Court to circumvent the
textual limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment to "state" action); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (essentially nullifying the plain meaning of the Contracts Clause).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. I have elaborated on the causes of this shift in Klarman, Brown, supra note 10, at 13-
71.
16. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). By the time the Court decided Roe, more than half of the nation
supported a woman's right to abortion. For the relevant opinion poll data, see DAVID J.
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE
513, 539, 562, 605 (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 261 (1991); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 577, 607 n.148 (1993).
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constitutionalizing minimum entitlements for the poor in the wake of
the Johnson Administration's War on Poverty.21
None of this is to deny, of course, that the Court can produce
marginally countermajoritarian results. The Justices' relative insula-
tion from politics enables them to frustrate narrow majorities, and the
gap between the values of the culturally elite Justices and the general
public may incline them toward a different slant on constitutional
issues than that of the political branches.2 2 Moreover, in relatively
rare cases, an especially determinate piece of constitutional text or an
unusually entrenched precedent might induce the Justices to resist
even a strong national consensus. 23 Yet when the Court resists the
will of a national majority, or even that of a strong minority, its deci-
sions usually incite determined resistance. Thus, for example, Dred
Scott v. Sandford24 rallied Republicans to defend the legitimacy of
their party;25 Brown v. Board of Education crystallized southern white
resistance to changes in the racial status quo;26 and Roe v. Wade ar-
guably mobilized a right-to-life movement that previously had not
played a prominent role in politics. 27
This Article will examine the Court's Progressive era race
cases in light of the paradigm sketched above. Specifically, should we
regard these decisions as consonant with contemporary public opin-
ion? If not, is the explanation for the disparity the divergent racial
views of the Justices or the unusual clarity with which the challenged
20. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Klarman, Rethinking, supra
note 10, at 46-62.
21. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); see also Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the
Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 219 (Vince
Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting that a faction of the Warren Court, though not clearly a majority,
was moving toward constitutionalizing minimum levels of subsistence, housing, and education);
Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARv. L. REV. 7, 8 (1969) (discussing the "role of courts... in an anti-poverty war").
22. On the latter point, see Michael J. Kiarman, What's So Great About
Constitutionalism? (forthcoming NW. U. L. REV. (fall 1998)).
23. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidating provision of federal
statute prohibiting states from denying the right to vote in state or local elections on account of
age to anyone 18 or older).
24. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
25. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 561-67 (1978) (concluding that the combination of Dred Scott and the furor
raised over the Lecompton Constitution probably explains the momentous Republican gains in
the lower North between 1856 and 1858, which ultimately enabled Lincoln to win the presi-
dency in 1860).
26. Klarman, Brown, supra note 10, at 85-150.
27. See JOHN C. JEFFEJES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 354-59 (1994); ROSENBERG,
supra note 19, at 188, 341-42; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1185, 1205 (1992).
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practices violated the Constitution?2 Finally, how much impact did
these rulings have upon actual racial practices?
I shall begin by seeking to establish a baseline against which
to measure the Progressive era race cases. Plessy v. Ferguson and
Williams v. Mississippi29 will serve as that baseline. In those land-
mark decisions, rendered in 1896 and 1898 respectively, the Court
rejected constitutional challenges to racial segregation and black
disfranchisement. Two decades later, in the midst of the Progressive
era, the Court issued four sets of decisions that appeared to represent
significant civil rights victories. Understanding the Progressive era
race decisions requires assessing both the extent to which they are in
legal tension with the earlier rulings and the extent to which the
surrounding extralegal context had changed in the intervening dec-
ades. So before looking closely at the Progressive era decisions, it will
be necessary to canvass the state of American race relations during
the 1890s and the 1910s. As to the latter period, we shall discover,
paradoxically, that while incipient forces for racial transformation
were at work, the actual state of race relations probably reached its
post-Civil War nadir.
Assessing the Court's Progressive era civil rights victories in
light of this oppressive extralegal context poses a puzzle. One possi-
bility is that these decisions test the limits of the Court's counterma-
joritarian potential. Given the disjunction between the rulings and
the state of racial practices at the time, it seems plausible that the
Supreme Court was at least mildly out of touch with dominant public
opinion on race. Alternatively, it is possible that even in the depths of
Progressive era racism, national opinion continued to endorse formal
compliance with constitutional norms, which is essentially all that the
Court's decisions required. I conclude that the latter interpretation
better fits the facts. That is, these four sets of decisions are best un-
28. Benno Schmidt nicely states the question:
[The White Court's] decisions upholding the constitutional rights of black people can be
viewed as the first serious judicial commitment to Reconstruction principles, a com-
mitment that after almost a half-century of neglect kept the promises of the Civil War
amendments from languishing into very deep depths of repose.... It is also possible to
take a more modest view: that the White Court happened along when the momentum of
racism in American society produced laws so blatantly, even absurdly, unconstitutional
that even a Court prepared to countenance racial segregation and the exclusion of black
people from politics and the judicial process, so long as these aims were not proclaimed
on the surface of state laws, was shamed into standing behind the formal validity of the
Civil War amendments.
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive
Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 459 (1982) [hereinafter, Schmidt
I].
29. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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derstood as minimalist constitutional interpretations-the very least
that a straight-faced commitment to constitutionalism entailed.
Nothing in these decisions, I shall argue, indicates any burgeoning
commitment on the Justices' part to the cause of racial justice. On
this view, the Fuller Court which decided Plessy and Williams might
well have resolved the Progressive era race cases the same way that
the White Court did.
Moreover, whatever the extent of their disjunction from popu-
lar opinion, the Progressive era race decisions were inconsequential in
result. Because the rulings were concerned with form rather than
substance, they were easily evaded in practice. For example, blacks
continued to be almost universally disfranchised after invalidation of
the grandfather clause, and American cities grew increasingly segre-
gated notwithstanding the Court's nullification of residential segrega-
tion ordinances. Nor is it likely that decisions addressed more to
substance than to form could have been efficacious at a time when
southern blacks lived in an environment too dangerous to permit the
development of a strong civil rights movement, and the national po-
litical branches possessed neither the inclination nor the tools with
which to coerce an intensely committed white South out of its racial
preferences.
II. CONTEXTUALIZING PLESSY
To assess whether the Progressive era decisions represented a
new departure on race, I shall measure them against a baseline of the
Fuller Court race decisions. Thus, it is necessary, first, to situate
those earlier cases within their sociopolitical context. We shall dis-
cover that race relations generally deteriorated between the 1890s
and the 1910s, while the Court's decisions improved from the perspec-
tive of racial justice. The purpose of this Article is to explore that
apparent paradox.
In Plessy v. Ferguson the Supreme Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to a Louisiana statute requiring railroads to
provide separate and equal accommodations to black and white pas-
sengers. The Court denied that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been "to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality."3O Further,
the Court denied that "the enforced separation of the two races
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" and insisted that
if blacks thought otherwise, this was "solely because [they] cho[se] to
put that construction upon it."31
In Williams v. Mississippi, the defendant challenged his
murder indictment on the ground that the grand jury was selected
from voter lists that systematically excluded blacks. 32 The Supreme
Court rejected this indirect constitutional challenge to Mississippi's
disfranchisement scheme. Eschewing the relevance of discriminatory
motive, the Court brushed aside candid admissions that the
Mississippi state constitutional convention of 1890 had deliberately
disfranchised blacks.33 Moreover, citing but failing adequately to
distinguish Yick Wo v. Hopkins,34 the Court refused to invalidate the
state's literacy test based on the allegation that it vested voting regis-
trars with virtually unfettered discretion to discriminate against
blacks. 35 The Yick Wo Court, however, had found a constitutional
violation not only in the discriminatory enforcement of the laundry
ordinance but also in its grant of uncabined discretion to the board of
supervisors.
Plessy in particular is a much vilified decision today.
Commentators have called it "ridiculous and shameful," "racist and
oppressive," and even, simply, "a catastrophe."36 Yet I would contend
that the sociopolitical context rendered the result virtually inevitable.
There was roughly as much chance of the Court deciding Plessy dif-
ferently in 1896 as there was of its protecting women's rights before
the rise of the women's movement, or gay rights before the rise of the
gay rights movement, or animal rights today. To portray Plessy as
simply a product of racist judging is to fundamentally misunderstand
it. Background social, political, economic, and ideological forces cre-
ated a climate within which judicial invalidation of a railway segrega-
31. Id. at 551.
32. 170 U.S. 213, 213 (1898).
33. See id. at 222-23.
34. See id. at 223-25 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
35. See id. at 225 (noting that "it has not been shown that their actual administration was
evil, but only that evil was possible under them").
36. JUDITH BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 112 (1983) ("racist and repressive"); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 145 (1994) ("ridiculous and shameful"); Paul Oberst, The Strange
Career of Plessy v. Ferguson, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 417 (1973) ("a catastrophe"); see also ROBERT
J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE SUPREME COURT
101 (1960) (calling Plessy "a compound of bad logic, bad history, bad sociology, and bad
constitutional law"). For additional examples of recent scholarship vilifying Plessy, see CHARLES
A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 3-4 (1987).
1998] 887
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tion law would have been dramatically countermajoritarian, and in-
deed virtually unthinkable.
It is useful to consider the extralegal forces responsible for the
dramatic deterioration in American race relations around the turn of
the century. In the South, race relations began to worsen appreciably
in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Political, economic, and social un-
rest were manifested in the rising strength of the Farmers' Alliance
and the Populist Party.37 The growing power of poorer whites did not
bode well for blacks, since the former's precarious social and economic
status inclined them toward measures highlighting their racial supe-
riority.38 At the same time, conservative wealthier whites, who tradi-
tionally had inclined toward more paternalistic attitudes toward
blacks, were now impelled to emphasize racial distinctions in order to
disrupt prospective economic and political alliances between poor
black and poor white farmers.39 Whatever the precise political dy-
namic, the upshot was a dramatic deterioration in southern race rela-
tions during the 1890s, which assumed a variety of forms. 40 The an-
37. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION chs. 9-10 (1992).
38. See C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 211-12 (1951);
VERNON LANE WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MSSISSIPPI 1865-1890, at 231-32 (1947); Patricia
Minter, The Codification of Jim Crow: The Origins of Segregated Railroad Transit in the South,
1865-1910, at 62, 83, 114-15 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia).
39. See, e.g., JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1900-1920, at 6-7
(1977); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY 1817-1914, at 266 (1971); Minter, supra note 38, at 184.
For scholars understanding disfranchisement in these terms-as a response to conservative
fears that a Populist economic alliance would form between blacks and lower class whites, see
JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 170 (1982); V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE
AND NATION 8, 541 (1949); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 18,
36-37, 147-48, 203, 221 (1974); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE
SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 9-10 (1976); HENRY L. MOON, BALANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE 72-
73 (1948); FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX IN THE SOUTH 11 (1958).
40. There is a long-standing debate among historians over how to date the rise of segrega-
tion. C. Vann Woodward, in his classic account, argued that the period between the end of
Reconstruction and 1890 was characterized by fluidity in southern race relations. Woodward
emphasized contemporary accounts of extensive integration in southern public accommodations
and railroad transportation. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 31-
44 (1955) [hereinafter WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER]. Other historians have provided similar
accounts, emphasizing the significant deterioration that took place in southern race relations in
the 1890s. See, e.g., GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES, 1877-1900, at 292-
302 (1952); WHARTON, supra note 38, at 230-33; CHARLES E. WYNES, RACE RELATIONS IN
VIRGINIA 1870-1902, at 149-50 (1961). However, Woodward has been criticized by other
historians for painting too rosy a portrait of the post-Reconstruction period. For example,
Howard Rabinowitz insists that in southern cities segregation had been the rule since immedi-
ately after the Civil War. See HOWARD RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH,
1865-1890 (1978) [hereinafter RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS]; see also JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER
SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 274-75, 298-99 (1965). The
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nual number of black lynchings rose dramatically, peaking early in
the decade. 41 Beginning with the Mississippi constitutional conven-
tion of 1890, southern states adopted formal measures such as poll
taxes, literacy tests, and residency requirements to supplement the de
facto disfranchisement of blacks already accomplished through vio-
lence and fraud by the late 1880s. 42 Extensive de facto railway segre-
gation was replaced with formal state-mandated segregation begin-
ning with a Florida statute in 1887 that quickly set the trend for
other southern states.43 Even in contexts untouched by formal legal
enactment, racial practices rapidly deteriorated around this time. For
example, New Orleans in the 1880s had witnessed significant integra-
tion in first-class railroad accommodations, interracial labor solidarity
debate between Woodward and his critics is usefully summarized in CELL, supra note 39, at 82-
102, and J. MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH CENTURY
LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 6-7 (1986), and is further developed in a
useful exchange between Woodward and Rabinowitz in Howard Rabinowitz, More Than the
Woodward Thesis: Assessing The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIST. 842 (1988), and
C. Vann Woodward, Strange Career Critics: Long May They Persevere, 75 J. AM. HIST. 857
(1988) [hereinafter Woodward, Critics].
Without getting into the debate over how to characterize southern race relations in the
1870s and 1880s, it seems to me difficult to deny, based on the developments described in the
text, that race relations deteriorated significantly in the 1890s.
41. See W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA,
1880-1930, at 7-8, 128, 166-69 (1993); WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY
AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861-1915, at 211 & tbl.9 (1991);
FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 272. But see GEORGE WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY,
1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" 8 (1990) (arguing that the heyday
of lynchings in Kentucky was in the period just after the Civil War). The best book to date on
the lynching phenomenon is BRUNDAGE, supra.
42. The classic account of black disfranchisement in the South remains KOUSSER, supra
note 39. See also AYERS, supra note 37, at ch.11; DrITrMER, supra note 39, at 90-109; DARLENE
CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS ch.1 (1979);
NEIL R. MCMILLEN, BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW ch.2 (1989); OGDEN, supra
note 39, at ch.1.
43. See CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF
SOUTHERN TRANSIT 7-8 (1983); COHEN, supra note 41, at 217, 220; DITTMER, supra note 39, at
19; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 291-92; WYNES, supra note 40, at 75-76; Schmidt I, supra note
28, at 463-464; Minter, supra note 38, at 85 & n.63. The eastern seaboard states of Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina did not pass their railroad segregation laws until roughly
the turn of the century. See Linda M. Matthews, Keeping Down Jim Crow: The Railroads and
the Separate Coach Bill in South Carolina, 73 S. ATL. Q. 117, 121 (1974); Minter, supra note 38,
at 161. Historians disagree over the extent to which these segregation laws simply formalized
an already existent reality. Compare Dale A. Somers, Black and White in New Orleans: A
Study in Urban Race Relations, 40 J. So. HIST. 19, 38 (1974), and RABINOWITZ, RACE
RELATIONS, supra note 40, at 182-97, with WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 40, at 33-
44, and WYNES, supra note 40, at 71-74.
None of this is to deny that in other areas of public life, segregation was deeply entrenched
well before the 1890s. Public education in the South, for example, had been almost universally
segregated from the date when blacks were first admitted. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV.
1881, 1891-92 & n.23 (1995) (collecting evidence).
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on the docks and in organizations like the Knights of Labor, an inter-
racial clientele among black and white prostitutes, interracial boxing
matches and baseball games, and black jockeys at the horse races.
Virtually all of this integration had disappeared from the city by the
early to mid-1890s, as white racial attitudes hardened and segrega-
tion pervaded new areas of life. 4 Historians have described a similar
rigidification of the color line in other southern locales at this same
time.45  A renewed interest in African migration among southern
blacks testified to the contemporary perception of deteriorating race
relations .46
The inclination of southern whites to further subordinate
blacks was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the deterio-
ration in American race relations that occurred in the 1890s. Without
northern acquiescence, conditions could not have worsened as much
as they did.47 Several factors explain the diminishing northern com-
mitment to racial equality at the end of the century.
First, a significant increase in black migration northwards
during the 1890s apparently caused many northern whites to adopt
characteristically southern ways of thinking about race.48  Fears
among northern whites of such a black exodus from the South had
been widespread around the time of the Civil War, but decreased
significantly after a substantial black migration into the old
Northwest in the 1860s tapered off in the 1870s and 1880s. 49 One
44. See Somers, supra note 43, at 20-42.
45. See, e.g., DITMER, supra note 39, at 8 (Georgia); WHARTON, supra note 38, at 230-33
(Mississippi); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, LIFE BEHIND AVEIL: BLACKS IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 1865-
1930, at 50, 59-60, 70-74 (1985) (Louisville, Kentucky).
46. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 175-76; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 263.
47. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 246; Somers, supra note 43, at 36. For discussion of the
debate among historians as to whether the removal of external constraints was simply neces-
sary, or necessary and sufficient, for the deterioration in southern race relations in the 1890s,
see CELL, supra note 39, at 86.
48. See DAvID A. GERBER, BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915, at 295 (1976);
JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE GREAT
MIGRATION 164 (1989); MICHAEL W. HOMEL, DOwN FROM EQUALITY: BLACK CHICAGOANS AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1920-1941, at 5 (1984); GILBERT OSOFsKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A
GHETTO 35, 40-42 (1963); ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO
1890-1920, at 7-8, 201 (1967).
49. During the Civil War, fears that emancipated slaves would migrate in large numbers
across the Ohio River led to race riots in southern Ohio and Indiana, as well as renewed efforts
to enforce the black exclusion laws of Indiana and Illinois. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 31-32 (1988); GERBER, supra note 48, at 28-29; EMMA LOU
THORNBROUGH, THE NEGRO IN INDIANA BEFORE 1900: A STUDY OF A MINORITY 184-91 (1957);
Leslie H. Fischel, Jr., The North and the Negro, 1865-1900: A Study in Race Discrimination 56-
57 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). On black population growth in
the Midwestern states, see GERBER, supra note 48, at 26, 41 (noting that Ohio's black population
grew by 72% during the 1860s, and only by 26% in the 1870s and 9% in the 1880s);
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might understand the proliferation in those decades of northern state
laws barring segregation in public schools and public accommodations
as a reflection of whites' relative racial tolerance in the face of small
black numbers." However, in the 1890s, black migration northwards
increased appreciably (though not nearly as much as it would during
World War I). Whereas southern black migration to northern and
western states had been about 49,000 in the 1870s and 62,000 in the
1880s, it rose to roughly 132,000 in the 1890s and 143,000 in the
1900s.51 This brought increased discrimination in public accommoda-
tions,52 occasional efforts to introduce racial segregation into the pub-
lic schools, 53 a rash of black lynchings, 54 and a general hardening of
racial attitudes.55
A second factor contributing to this convergence of northern
and southern racial attitudes was the nation's imperialist adventures
of the 1890s.56 Beginning with the clamor for the annexation of
Hawaii early in the decade and culminating with the acquisition of
THORNBROUGH, supra, at 206, 207 n.2 (noting little increase in Indiana's black population in the
1880s after a very large increase in the 1860s and a smaller but still significant increase in the
1870s); Roger D. Bridges, Equality Deferred: Civil Rights for Illinois Blacks, 1865-1885, 74 J.
ILL. STATE HIST. SOC'Y 83, 84 (1981) (noting that Illinois's black population grew by nearly 270%
during the Civil War years). For data detailing net black migration from the South to the North
by decade from 1870 to 1930, see COHEN, supra note 41, at 93.
50. There is a growing body of literature describing the northern public accommodations
laws and anti-school segregation laws of the 1880s. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 48, at 41, 45,
56-57, 190-244; LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE NEGRO: NORTHERN AND
NATIONAL POLITICS, 1868-92, at 63-106 (1976); KOUSSER, supra note 40 (discussing litigation
over segregated schools); THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 259-61, 288-346; Davison M.
Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School Segregation in the Pre-
Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677, 684-97, 701-04 (1997); Fischel, supra note 49, chs. 4-5, 7;
David Martin Ment, Racial Segregation in the Public Schools of New England and New York,
1840-1940, at chs. 1-4 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
51. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 93 tbl.4; see also GERBER, supra note 48, at 276;
GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 164; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 207 n.2.
52. See, e.g., DAvID M. KATZMAN, BEFORE THE GHETTO: BLACK DETROIT IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 93 (1973); THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 265; Fischel, supra note 49,
at 363.
53. See SPEAR, supra note 48, at 23, 45; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 332; August
Meier & Elliott M. Rudwick, Early Boycotts of Segregated Schools: The Alton, Illinois Case,
1897-1908, 36 J. NEGRO EDUC. 394, 395 (1967) [hereinafter Meier & Rudwick, Alton, Illinois];
August Meier & Elliott M. Rudwick, Early Boycotts of Segregated Schools: The East Orange,
New Jersey, Experience, 1899-1906, 4 HIsT. EDU. Q. 22, 22-23 (1967) [hereinafter Meier &
Rudwick, East Orange]; see also People v. City of Alton, 54 N.E. 421, 428 (Ill. 1899)
(acknowledging that Illinois law clearly prohibits school segregation, but nonetheless declaring
that "[i]t may be that the wisest of both races believe that the best interests of each would be
promoted by voluntary separation in the public schools").
54. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 249-57 (noting a rise in lynchings in Ohio in the early
1890s); THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 279-82 (Indiana); Fischel, supra note 49, at 421, 423-
24.
55. See, e.g., SPEAR, supra note 48, at 23; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 392.
56. See WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 40, at 72-73.
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Puerto Rico and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of
1898, both supporters and opponents of imperialism argued their case
partly in racial terms.57 Anti-imperialists (predominantly south-
erners) argued against incorporating "inferior races" into the
American body politic. 58 Yet imperialism's defenders intended no
such thing. They supported territorial acquisition in the racial terms
of Manifest Destiny and rejected extension of full citizenship rights to
persons thus incorporated into the United States-a position that the
Supreme Court conveniently accommodated in the Insular Cases.59
With northerners defending imperialism in white supremacist terms,
it became increasingly difficult for them to criticize southern racial
practices.60 Thus, for example, one contemporary southerner doubted
that the North would undertake another experiment in imposing
egalitarian racial views on the South after the nation's experience in
the Philippines. 61
A third factor tending to make northern whites more sympa-
thetic toward southern racial policies was the immigration of millions
of southern and eastern Europeans (disproportionately Catholic and
Jewish) beginning in the 1880s and accelerating dramatically around
the turn of the century.62 Northerners concerned about the dilution of
"Anglo-Saxon racial stock"63 were attracted to southern solutions to
the race problem. One Mississippi delegate to the 1903 annual meet-
57. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 64-70 (1988).
58. See, e.g., FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 305-06; LAUREN, supra note 57, at 60-63;
Christopher Lasch, The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man, 24 J. SO.
HIST. 319 (1958).
59. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (limiting the Constitution's applica-
bility to newly acquired territory). On the extent to which the Insular Cases represented a repu-
diation of traditional notions of the Constitution following the flag, see GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 72-89 (1996).
60. See THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 315; WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note
40, at 72-73.
61. See Clarence H. Poe, Suffrage Restrictions in the South: Its Causes and Consequences,
175 NO. AM. REV. 534, 542 (1902); see also Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 452-53 ("As Republicans
and Progressives rallied behind imperialist adventures abroad that brought eight million non-
whites under force of American arms, they took up characteristic Southern attitudes toward
black people."); Benno C. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the
Progressive Era. Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 835, 844 (1982) [hereinafter, Schmidt III] (quoting the South Carolina politician
Pitchfork Ben Tillman to similar effect).
62. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 453 (noting that a "growing apprehension about
waves of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe found an outlet in crude racial antipa-
thies that led many among the Northern, urban middle classes to look with quickened sympathy
on the racial anxieties of Southern whites"); LAUREN, supra note 57, at 41, 60-64; LOFGREN,
supra note 36, at 99.
63. CARL DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF
DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 48-49 (1991).
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ing of the National American Woman's Suffrage Association nicely
captured this dynamic when she observed that
[just as surely as the North will be forced to turn to the South for the nation's
salvation [on account of the purity of its Anglo-Saxon blood], just so surely will
the South be compelled to look to its Anglo-Saxon women as a medium through
which to retain the supremacy of the white race over the African.
64
The demise of the Republican Party's traditional commitment
to civil rights was a fourth factor in the nation's acquiescence in
southern racial practices, though it is difficult to separate cause from
effect. That is, deteriorating Republican Party attitudes toward civil
rights are partly attributable to the growing racism of its northern
constituents, which reflected some of the other factors discussed
above. But the Party's slackening commitment to racial equality is
also attributable to the changing political geography of the nation in
the mid-1890s, and thus should be seen as an independent contribut-
ing factor in the deterioration of race relations. Specifically, the 1894
congressional elections and the 1896 presidential contest yielded an
electoral realignment, from which Republicans emerged with reason-
ably secure control over the national government (lasting until the
1930s). Northern states that had been evenly divided between
Democrats and Republicans from 1874 to 1894 now became reliably
Republican, thus removing the Party's incentive to bargain for black
votes, which in the 1870s and 1880s occasionally had represented the
margin of difference in tightly contested states. 65
From this perspective, the congressional defeat of the Lodge
Elections Bill in 1890-91 should be seen as the last gasp effort of the
old Republican Party to secure southern blacks' rights.66 No similar
exertion was made until the first serious effort to enact anti-lynching
legislation in the early 1920s. The altered Republican attitude toward
race in the 1890s was demonstrated in many ways, including the
64. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920,
at 202 (1965).
65. For this paragraph, see GERBER, supra note 48, at 338; KATZMAN, supra note 52, at
196; DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY 1930-
1970, at 70 (1982); THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 315; Meier & Rudwick, East Orange, supra
note 53, at 25, 31.
For a description of blacks effectively using their balance of power leverage in the 1870s
and 1880s, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
66. See Richard E. Welch, Jr., The Federal Elections Bill of 1890: Postscripts and Prelude,
52 J. AM. HIST. 511, 525 (1965) (noting that the Lodge bill was "the last significant effort in
behalf of equal political rights for the American Negro," and with its defeat the Republican
Party "abdicated the field of civil rights legislation"). The political history of the Lodge bill is
usefully described in GROSSMAN, supra note 50, at 143-56.
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McKinley Administration's decision to court southern whites with
patronage positions traditionally allocated to southern blacks;
McKinley's emphasis in his second inaugural address on sectional
reconciliation and his silence on black rights; the Party's retrogressive
position on black voting rights in its 1900 platform; and the increas-
ingly lily white hue of northern state Republican parties.67  As we
shall see, the Republican Party's historical commitment to racial
equality continued to deteriorate through the Progressive years and
arguably throughout the 1920s.
A fifth factor contributing to the downward spiral in American
race relations was the triumph of social Darwinism and theories of
scientific racism, though again it is difficult to separate cause from
effect. 68 Most contemporary social scientists were convinced that
higher rates of crime, venereal disease, and poverty among blacks
were attributable to factors endemic to their race, rather than to
environment or culture.69 Indeed, many contemporaries, influenced
by social Darwinism, predicted the ultimate extinction of the black
race.70 Whites who a generation earlier might have favored efforts to
educate and improve the black race now endorsed quarantining or
eliminating blacks because their social Darwinism condemned efforts
at improvement as futile. 71
A couple of other factors also contributed to the worsening of
race relations around the turn of the century. A growing desire for
sectional reconciliation could be satisfied only by extending "home
67. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 247, 364; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 315-16. It is
instructive to note the progressively briefer and more tepid voting rights planks contained in
Republican Party platforms from 1888 to 1900. See NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1972, at
80, 93-94, 109, 123 (Donald Bruce Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., 5th ed. 1975) (reprinting the
platforms).
68. See, e.g., DEGLER, supra note 63, at ch.1; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 228-56;
LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 99, 104; Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624; Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 453 (noting that "[plerhaps the most
important impetus for the hardening of Northern attitudes toward black people was the vogue
of Darwinism").
Degler plainly views scientific attitudes as more effect than cause. See, e.g., DEGLER, supra
note 63, at viii. Fredrickson is less explicit but seems to incline toward a similar view. See
FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 254-55, 329-31. Hovenkamp, on the other hand, appears to
regard science as more of an autonomous factor-that is, a cause, rather than effect, of deterio-
rating racial attitudes.
69. See DEGLER, supra note 63, at 14-19; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 228-55;
LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 99-111.
70. See FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 245-54; MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW
SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 252 (1994); LAUREN,
supra note 57, at 48; LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 107-11.
71. See DEGLER, supra note 63, at 23-25; LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 107-11; Schmidt I,
supra note 28, at 453.
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rule" to white southerners on the race question.7 2 Manifest Destiny
and the Spanish-American war, which produced the usual nationalist
effect on Americans, may have promoted this desire for sectional
reconciliation.73 One important manifestation of this commitment
was Republican President William Howard Taft's decision to elevate
Associate Justice Edward D. White, a former Confederate officer and
Redeemer Democrat, to the Chief Justiceship in 1910-a move that
contemporaneously would not have appeared auspicious for the cause
of civil rights.74 Another factor that may have contributed to north-
erners' increased willingness to acquiesce in southern racial practices
was the demise of the last remnants of an abolitionist generation that
had been genuinely committed to racial equality.75
This was the extralegal context within which the Supreme
Court decided Plessy. The Court's decision was, indeed, so fully con-
gruent with the dominant racial norms of the period that it elicited
little more than a collective yawn of indifference from the nation.76
Our foremost academic authority on Plessy, Charles Lofgren, observes
that "the nation's press met the decision mainly with apathy."77 Even
in an earlier era characterized by a relatively greater commitment to
racial equality, state and lower federal courts generally had construed
the Equal Protection Clause (as well as the common law and the Civil
Rights Act of 1875) to permit separate but equal facilities.78 The
Supreme Court was not about to rule otherwise as American race
relations began a long spiral downwards.
72. See WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 40, at 70 (explaining the desire for sec-
tional reconciliation as a product of northern liberals' desire to deprive "reactionary" Republican
politicians of the race issue which they used to rally the Republican faithful); id. at 71
(explaining contemporaneous Supreme Court decisions as part of a similar effort to achieve
sectional reconciliation).
73. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 361-62 (noting that President McKinley began to court
the white South in 1899 as a result of the sectional reconciliation fostered by the Spanish-
American War, visiting Atlanta to praise southern traditions and salute Confederate Civil War
heroes); id. at 364 (noting that McKinley in his Second Inaugural spoke of sectional reconcili-
ation but not of black rights); WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 40, at 70-74.
74. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 460.
75. See HOMEL, supra note 48, at 5.
76. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 469 (noting Plessy "was greeted by the Nation with
hardly a ripple of notice").
77. See LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 5; id. at 196-98; see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH
OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 482 (1988) (noting that while
the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 had elicited a strong protest in some parts of the North, "the
Plessy decision caused hardly a ripple").
78. See LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 200; Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim
Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 17, 25-27, 30-35, 38 (1984).
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III. CONTEXTUALIZING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA RACE CASES
The question for us now is how to interpret Supreme Court
decisions fifteen to twenty years later that seemed to represent sig-
nificant victories for the cause of civil rights. One might understand
those decisions in any of three ways-as products of a changed so-
ciopolitical context, a disparity between the racial views of the
Justices and those of popular culture, or a minimalist commitment to
constitutionalism. On this last account, even a Court relatively
unsympathetic toward racial equality might feel bound to invalidate
racist practices in plain contravention of the constitutional text and
original intent. White southerners indicated their appreciation of this
point by turning to disfranchisement devices that fell short of facially
race-based exclusions from the suffrage, which they feared courts
would invalidate under the Fifteenth Amendment.79 Plessy, on the
other hand, had not presented the Court with such a case. "Separate
but equal" is not obviously incompatible with "equal protection of the
laws," and the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment
plainly had tolerated segregation in at least some settings, such as
public educationso Thus, when Brown effectively overruled Plessy,
one could be substantially certain that it was sociopolitical factors,
rather than "law," which impelled that result.8' With regard to the
Progressive era race cases, though, one cannot reach any definitive
conclusion; measuring the extent to which "law" compelled those
results is impossible, and thus one has no means of distinguishing the
influence upon the Justices of legal as opposed to extralegal forces.
While the point is contestable, my sense is that given the continued
deterioration in race relations during the Progressive era, and the
limits of the potential gap between the racial views of the Justices
and those of the public, the Court's decisions should be seen as a
product of a minimalist commitment to constitutionalism. That is,
the racial practices at issue were so obviously unconstitutional that
79. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 836.
80. As to whether the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment barred racial
segregation in public schools, compare Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (affirmative), with Klarman, supra note 43
(negative). The weight of scholarly opinion is, as Professor McConnell acknowledges, heavily
against him.
81. See Kiarman, Brown, supra note 10, at 13-71. Interestingly, internal evidence seems
to confirm that the Justices themselves appreciated both that legal sources could not readily
justify the result in Brown and that sociopolitical factors were pushing the country toward
greater racial equality. I have summarized this evidence in Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights
Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433,458 (1994) (book review).
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even a Court relatively unsympathetic to racial equality felt bound to
invalidate them.
Having said this, one qualification is in order. The sociopoliti-
cal context of the Progressive era race cases poses something of a
paradox. One can detect during this period the emergence of extrale-
gal factors that ultimately would make possible the interment of Jim
Crow. Yet these factors are discernable in the Progressive era only
with the aid of historical hindsight; they were in incipient stages, and
it strains credulity to suggest that they significantly influenced the
Court's civil rights decisions (even if one believes, as I think is plausi-
ble, that the Justices are among the first in society to feel the force of
these sorts of changes), s2 For those actually living through the
Progressive era, race relations appeared to have reached a post-Civil
War nadir; conditions were appreciably worse than they had been, for
example, at the time of Plessy.89 In light of this extralegal context,
then, one must explain the Court's Progressive era race decisions as a
product either of a minimalist commitment to constitutionalism or of
one of the largest gaps between judicial and popular attitudes in
American historyr 4 I shall argue for the former interpretation. Yet
whichever view one accepts, it should be possible to agree upon the
decisions' limited impact on American race relations. In terms of
concrete consequences, as opposed to symbolism, the Court's rulings
made almost no difference in the lives of African-Americans.
A. Incipient Forces for Racial Change
I shall first describe some of the extralegal forces that, while
only in preliminary stages of development during the Progressive era,
ultimately would combine to transform American race relations.
Then, I shall turn to a description of the sorry state of actual racial
practices during the second decade of the twentieth century.
A particularly momentous force for racial change in American
history was the Great Migration of southern blacks to the North and
82. Benno Schmidt suggests that the White Court's race decisions might have been influ-
enced by World War I and the Great Migration, but the timing is wrong. Only Buchanan came
down after the Great Migration had commenced and the country had entered the European war.
See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 460.
83. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 297-98 (noting that just as the South was enforcing the
starkest forms of racial oppression, it was simultaneously making the "barest beginning" in the
opposite direction); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 457 (calling the Progressive era "the worst of
times and the best of times for the freedmen").
84. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 446 (noting that "[tihe challenge for constitutional
historians is to understand why these decisions occurred at a time when race relations in law,
politics, and general social contemplation hit rock-bottom levels of injustice and callousness").
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West. Black migration northwards, which had appreciably increased
in the 1890s and 1900s, exploded in 1916 owing to World War I.
President Wilson's preparedness campaign put strains on the indus-
trial labor force at the same time that submarine warfare dramati-
cally curtailed European immigration. As a result, significant indus-
trial opportunities opened for blacks in northern cities for the first
time ever.8 5 Half a million southern blacks migrated northwards
during the second decade of the century.86 The black population of
many northern cities more than doubled as a result.87 Over the next
half-century, 500,000 would grow to 5,000,000. In 1910, 90% of
American blacks lived in the South; by 1960, that figure was down to
50%.88
I do not mean to suggest that this Great Migration had only
positive consequences for American race relations. As we already
have seen, northern attitudes toward race became more southern as
black numbers increased-a development confirmed by the northern
race riots that accompanied World War 1.89 Yet it is impossible to
miss the overall positive effect of the Great Migration on American
race relations. First, the black migration northwards eventually
would produce a potent northern black political presence. Blacks
relocated from a region where they had been almost universally dis-
franchised to one where they not only voted without racial restriction
but also would often represent the margin of difference between the
two major political parties (after the electoral realignment of the
85. The best book on the Great Migration is GROSSMAN, supra note 48. I have also relied
on the discussions in COHEN, supra note 41, at 103-08; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 186-91;
MCADAM, supra note 65, at 74-75, 77-81; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 263-67; Guy B. Johnson,
The Negro Migration and Its Consequences, 2 J. SOC. FORCES 404 (1924). Historians have
disagreed about whether push or pull factors mattered more in producing the Great Migration.
Grossman seems inclined to downplay pull factors. See GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 14-18, 69.
But given that southern blacks had endured oppression for a long time without leaving the
South, it seems hard to deny that the proximate cause of the huge exodus that began in the
1910s was the sudden opening of industrial opportunities in the North as a result of World War
I. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 108 (calling the escape from oppression, violence, and disfran-
chisement "fringe benefits" of a migration that was primarily driven by economic motivations);
id. at 105 (noting the unlikelihood that the pre-Great Migration black movement northwards
was driven primarily by racial oppression given how little of it originated in the deep South); see
also Jack Temple Kirby, The Southern Exodus, 1910-1960: A Primer for Historians, 49 J. SO.
HIST. 585, 589-90 (1983) (discussing factors leading to the migration).
86. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 3; MCADAM, supra note 65, at 78 tbl.5.2;
ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP'S CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 36 (1980).
87. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 470 (Cleveland and other Ohio cities); GROSSMAN, supra
note 48, at 4 (Chicago and Detroit); SPEAR, supra note 48, at 40 (Chicago).
88. See MCADAM, supra note 65, at 77, 78 tbl.5.2; see also Kirby, supra note 85, at 594.
89. See, e.g., SPEAR, supra note 48, at 146.
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1930s).90 Indeed, as early as the 1870s and 1880s, when northern
states had been electorally competitive and low black migration had
quieted white racial fears, northern blacks had used the ballot to
extract political benefits such as patronage appointments, state laws
barring segregation in public accommodations and schools, and occa-
sionally even election to public office.91
The much larger black political presence issuing from the
Great Migration translated into correspondingly greater political
clout. During the Progressive era, this political power was largely
confined to the local level. In Chicago, for example, where the city's
black population doubled within just a few years during the 1910s,
blacks reaped the rewards of providing the margin of victory for the
mayoral candidacies of Republican "Big Bill" Thompson: civil service
positions proportionate to black percentages of the population, ap-
pointment of substantial numbers of black police officers, considerable
school desegregation, and vocal mayoral criticism of discrimination in
public accommodations.92 Similarly, in New York City an explosion of
black migration into Harlem between 1910 and 1930 produced politi-
cal power sufficient to secure many concessions, including the ap-
pointment of large numbers of black policemen and firemen, access for
black doctors to Harlem Hospital, the establishment of a training
school for black nurses, the enactment of civil rights laws extending
the reach of earlier equal accommodations provisions, the creation of
the first black National Guard unit, the construction of new play-
grounds and parks for the black community, and the elevation of
blacks to the state legislature and state bench.9 3
90. See WILLIAM C. BERMAN, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE TRUMAN
ADMINISTRATION 80-81 (1970); LAWSON, supra note 39, at 346; MOON, supra note 39, at 10, 35,
198; NANCY J. WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN: BLACK POLITICS IN THE AGE OF FDR
181-83 (1983); Walter Dean Burnham, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,
59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 7, 12 (1965) (discussing the electoral realignment of the 1930s).
91. The best account of these developments is GROSSMAN, supra note 50, at 60-106. Also
very helpful are GERBER, supra note 48, at 331-36; KATZMAN, supra note 52, at 175-207;
THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 288-317.
92. See HAROLD F. GOSNELL, NEGRO POLITICIANS: THE RISE OF NEGRO POLITICS IN
CHICAGO 37, 40-41, 55-56, 80-81, 200, 204, 213, 237, 250-51, 367-68 (1935); GROSSMAN, supra
note 48, at 176-77; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 35-36, 120-25, 187-91; WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR.,
RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919, at 124-208 (1970); see also COHEN, supra
note 41, at 103 (black patronage in Chicago and Detroit); THOMAS C. Cox, BLACKS IN TOPEKA,
KANSAS 1865-1915: A SOCIAL HISTORY 189-90 (1982) (Topeka, Kansas); KENNETH L. KUSMER, A
GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at 245-47, 252, 271-74 (1976) (Cleveland);
ROBERTA SENECHAL, THE SOCIOGENESIS OF A RACE RIOT: SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS IN 1908, at 81
(1990) (Springfield, Illinois).
93. See OSOFSKY, supra note 48, at 159-78.
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Some years later this burgeoning black political power would
make itself felt at the national level. The first inkling of what was to
come was the introduction of an anti-lynching bill in 1918 by a
Republican congressman from St. Louis with a large black constitu-
ency.94 There soon followed the election in 1928 of the first black
congressman in the twentieth century (from Chicago);95 the Senate
defeat in 1930 of the nomination of Judge John Parker to the United
States Supreme Court partly as a result of an NAACP campaign op-
posing the candidate on the ground of his alleged racism; 96 the failure
in 1944 of the Democratic vice-presidential nomination campaign of
South Carolinian James Byrnes partly due to his unacceptability to
northern blacks;97 and President Harry S. Truman's decision after the
disastrous 1946 off-year elections to bid for black votes with a strong
civil rights platform, ultimately leading to his famous executive or-
ders in 1948 desegregating the military and the federal civil service.98
Black political power at the national level was most prominent after
World War II, but it was attributable directly to the Great Migration
that commenced in 1916.
Black migration northwards augured well for the cause of civil
rights in other ways as well. Better economic opportunities had been
the principal inspiration for the Great Migration. Black economic
advances would facilitate the social protest movement of subsequent
decades. A larger northern black population meant a broader eco-
nomic base for black-owned businesses and black professionals such
as teachers, ministers, lawyers, and doctors, who one day would sup-
94. See ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 42-43; George C. Rable, The South and the Politics
of Antilynching Legislation, 1920-1940, 51 J. So. HIST. 201, 203-04 (1985).
95. See GOSNELL, supra note 92, at 80-81.
96. See KENNETH W. GOINGS, "THE NAACP COMES OF AGE": THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN
J. PARKER 34, 38, 48 (1990); MOON, supra note 39, at 109-12; Richard L. Watson, Jr., The Defeat
of Judge Parker: A Study in Pressure Groups and Politics, 50 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 213,
217-22, 230 (1963).
97. See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT TO
REAGAN 175 (1990); ROBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S. TRUMAN: A LIFE 165-68 (1994); DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 297, 302-03, 311-12 (1992).
98. See BERMAN, supra note 90, at 79-135; Harvard Sitkoff, Harry Truman and the
Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics, 37 J. So. HIST. 597
(1971). Truman biographers have been understandably loath to adopt the political explanation
for his civil rights conversion. See FERRELL, supra note 97, at 292-99; MCCULLOUGH, supra note
97, at 587-89. Berman, on the other hand, emphasizes Truman's political motives. See also
DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND SOUTHERN
CULTURE, 1940 TO THE PRESENT 54-55 (1990) (also emphasizing the political explanation).
Other scholars have declined to choose between the political and humanitarian accounts, noting
that both may have explanatory power. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 39, at 120, 137; JOHN F.
MARTIN, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1945-1976, at




ply much of the leadership for the civil rights movement. 9
Participation in civil rights protest generally requires some measure
of economic independence (sorely lacking for most southern blacks,
who worked for white planters), leisure time, and disposable
income-all of which depend upon an improved economic position,
which the Great Migration ultimately afforded.100 Moreover, blacks
quickly discovered how to use economic clout as a lever for social
change, beginning with the "don't shop where you can't work" boycotts
of the Depression era.101
Relocation from South to North also meant a better educated
black population-a virtual prerequisite for an effective civil rights
movement. Educated people are better able to learn of or imagine a
world different from the one they inhabit, and any effective social
protest movement requires an educated leadership. In the South,
white public opinion strongly opposed black education, black schools
were obscenely underfunded, and secondary education for blacks was
almost nonexistent. In the North, on the other hand, the political and
business elite agreed on the importance of education for all, and black
migrants eagerly took advantage of the educational opportunities
made available to them. In some cases, northern schools were racially
integrated, while in others they were segregated but were more
nearly equal than those in the South.102
99. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 318, 472; GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 129;
THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 360.
100. See, e.g., MCADAM, supra note 65, at 135.
101. See AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS IN
THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 315-32 (1976); Henry Allen Bullock, Urbanization and Race Relations,
in THE URBAN SOUTH 207, 218 (Rupert P. Vance & Nicholas J. Demerath eds., 1954); see also
SPEAR, supra note 48, at 199 (noting such a campaign originating in Chicago in 1929). For
similar use of such boycotts in the South during the civil rights movement of the 1950s and
1960s, see, for example, AMELIA P. BOYNTON, BRIDGE ACROSS JORDAN: THE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN SELMA, ALABAMA 134-36 (1979) (Selma); DAVID J. GARROW,
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE 26, 53, 64 (1986) (Montgomery); NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL:
ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-1964, at 211-12 (1971)
(Orangeburg, South Carolina); ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE 72, 96, 101-02, 128-29, 131 (1985) (Tuskegee); Glenn T. Eskew,
The Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights and the Birmingham Struggle for Civil
Rights, 1956-1963, in BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, 1956-1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS 68-71 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989) (Birmingham).
102. On the points in this paragraph, see JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS
IN THE SOUTH, 1860-1935, at 22, 25, 95-97, 197-98 (1988); GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 246-51;
Michael W. Homel, Two Worlds of Race? Urban Blacks and the Public Schools, North and
South, 1865-1940, in SOUTHERN CITIES, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE URBAN
SOUTH 251 (David N. Plank & Rick Ginsberg eds., 1990) (noting the reluctance of white south-
erners to educate blacks and the absence of black high schools in the South); see also
THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 392 (noting the significant educational progress made by
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The Great Migration also improved the lives of black
Americans simply by making them visible to the political, economic,
and social elite of the nation. In an era of relatively primitive com-
munications, with no radio or television and little in the way of n -
tional news magazines, blacks in the southern countryside could be
disfranchised, coerced in their labor, cheated out of their fair share of
the public school fund, and even lynched without most northern
whites being aware of what was transpiring.10 3  After the Great
Migration of World War I, though, the plight of blacks became more
salient to the nation's policymakers. Thus, for example, the horrible
northern race riots of 1919 forced the race issue upon the national
consciousness to a degree not seen since Reconstruction.' °4
Finally, many historians have suggested that the Great
Migration may have had the incidental consequence of tempering
black mistreatment in the South. While some white southerners were
happy to see blacks exit the region, many in positions of power-most
notably, large planters-were not.105  Thus the Great Migration in-
duced many southern cities and states to promise, and apparently to
some unascertainable degree to deliver, ameliorative racial policies
such as anti-lynching laws, increased funding for black education,
higher agricultural wages, and fairer treatment in the courts.106
Before World War I induced a black migration northwards in
search of economic opportunity, the South had witnessed an internal
migration from countryside to city inspired by similar motives. This
migration also was in its incipient stages during the Progressive pe-
riod, though it was farther along than was the northern migration.07
Indiana blacks by the turn of the century, even though the state's segregated schools generally
were not equal).
103. On the importance of the twentieth-century communications revolution to the civil
rights movement, see Klarman, Brown, supra note 10, at 49-51 (collecting sources).
104. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 171-72 (noting that the race riots of 1919
altered the priorities of northern liberal reformers such as Jane Addams, who previously had
focused upon problems flowing from urbanization and immigration, but after 1919 were com-
pelled to pay greater attention to race); SPEAR, supra note 48, at 129-30 (noting that with the
migration of African-Americans to the North, the notion that the "negro problem" would remain
a Southern problem was destroyed).
105. William Cohen deftly notes the conflicts within the southern white community over
the desirability of black emigration, especially in the context of differing attitudes toward labor
control statutes. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 233-37, 249-50, 298.
106. See, e.g., BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 209, 229-30; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 189;
GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 50, 52, 54, 60-61; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 278-81.
107. See, e.g., DITMER, supra note 39, at 27 (noting that the number of Georgia blacks liv-
ing in urban areas increased from 160,000 in 1900 to 250,000 in 1920); GROSSMAN, supra note
48, at 31 (noting a gradual increase in southern black migration to cities and towns even before
World War I); Raymond Gavins, Urbanization and Segregation: Black Leadership Patterns in
Richmond, Virginia, 1900-1920, 79 S. ATLANTIC Q. 257, 259 (1980) (noting the large increase in
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Indeed, it was this internal black migration that produced the resi-
dential segregation ordinances that gave rise to the Supreme Court's
decision in Buchanan v. Warley.0 8
This phenomenon of southern black urbanization ultimately
would have momentous consequences for American race relations.109
Better economic opportunities in citiesilO ultimately led to the creation
of a substantial black middle class, which possessed the disposable
income and leisure time necessary for involvement in social protest
activity. Urban blacks also were far more likely to be economically
independent of whites, and thus were better able to challenge the
racial status quo without endangering their livelihood."' Moreover,*
blacks received far better education in southern cities than in rural
counties.112
Southern urbanization, in addition to bettering blacks' eco-
nomic and educational situation, increased their political power, as
suffrage restrictions never had been quite as stringent in southern
cities."3 Urbanization also loosened the restraints on social protest
activity, since urban racial norms tended to be somewhat less oppres-
Richmond's black population between 1900 and 1920). The same phenomenon of black (and
white) urbanization took place in the North some decades earlier. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note
48, at 272 (noting that the black population of Ohio was 38% urban in 1870 and 74% in 1910).
108. See infra note 299.
109. See Bullock, supra note 101, at 207; see also AYERS, supra note 37, at 137 (suggesting
that railroad segregation in the South was partially a product of growing urbanization and the
increased penetration of railroads); Woodward, Critics, supra note 40, at 858-60 (conceding that
urbanization produced Jim Crow). John Cell has usefully emphasized that segregation and
white supremacy are not inconsistent with modernization phenomena such as urbanization and
industrialization. See generally CELL, supra note 39. However, it is possible to believe that
segregation, while consistent with and perhaps even immediately inspired by urbanization, was
difficult to maintain over the long term in the face of social, political, and economic forces
unleashed by urbanization.
110. See ANDERSON, supra note 102, at 152; Bullock, supra note 101, at 210, 215-16.
111. See, e.g., HINE, supra note 42, at 56-57 (noting the existence of a thriving black middle
class in Houston by the 1920s which was relatively immune from white economic retaliation and
had the disposable income to invest in civil rights litigation); see id. at 74-75 (noting that
Lawrence Nixon, the plaintiff in the first two Texas white primary suits to reach the Supreme
Court, was an El Paso physician who was relatively immune from white economic retaliation);
id. at 130 (noting the same point about Richard Grovey, another plaintiff in white primary
litigation, who ran a black barbershop in Houston); MCADAM, supra note 65, at 135; Steven F.
Lawson, From Sit-In to Race Riot, in SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN AND DESEGREGATION 257, 260
(Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982).
112. See CELL, supra note 39, at 131-32; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 144 (noting that black
teachers in the cities were dramatically better qualified than in the countryside); id. at 146
(noting that high school education was available to blacks only in the cities); MCADAM, supra
note 65, at 97-98, 183-84.
113. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH
CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 32 (1989); ALEXANDER HEARD, A TWO-
PARTY SOUTH? 195 (1952); LAWSON, supra note 39, at 19-20.
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sive,"1 as evidenced by the fact that lynchings historically had been
largely a rural phenomenon." 5 Finally, urbanization reduced some of
the collective action barriers to a social protest movement by placing
participants in greater physical proximity, improving their communi-
cation and transportation facilities, and creating social networks that
could offset some of the intimidating free rider problems that confront
any social protest movement.116 As with black migration to the North,
however, the phenomenon of southern black urbanization was only in
its incipient stages during the Progressive era, and thus was unlikely
to have had much impact on the Supreme Court's decisionmaking.
Blacks were making dramatic educational advances by the
Progressive era, even apart from the gains that accrued as a result of
urbanization. Black illiteracy for ages ten and over in the South fell
from 76.2% in 1880 to 26% in 1920.17 A South African observer in
1915 was impressed with the extraordinary progress southern blacks
had made in terms of literacy and land ownership, which in his view
disproved the notion that blacks could not improve themselves as a
race." 8 Similarly, Moorfield Storey, the Boston Brahmin who served
as NAACP President and appellate advocate during the Progressive
era, noted in 1913 the rise in black literacy rates and property owner-
ship and concluded: "No race in the history of the world to my knowl-
edge has made such progress from such beginnings in so short a
time." 19 Heightened black literacy was important because an edu-
cated leadership generally is necessary for successful social protest
114. See, e.g., MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 134 (noting that challenges to segre-
gation or disfranchisement were more practicable in cities like New Orleans, Richmond, or
Louisville, where the social environment was less oppressive and where white lawyers handling
the case were less likely to be subjected to community censure); Bullock, supra note 101, at 220-
21; Gavins, supra note 107, at 257 (noting that "violent reprisals" were less prevalent in
Richmond than in the rural South); Somers, supra note 43, at 20-21 (noting a greater fluidity
and spirit of tolerance in southern cities, as contrasted with the rural South).
115. See AYERS, supra note 37, at 156-57; BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 104, 124, 126-27,
159; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 230; ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 9.
116. See, e.g., CELL, supra note 39, at 131-32; MCADAM, supra note 65, at 77, 128-32
(emphasizing the importance of organizational "integration" for civil rights activity); Bullock,
supra note 101, at 220-21.
117. See ROBERTA. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH, 1880-1950: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 7 tbl.2.1 (1990); see also ANDERSON, supra note 102, at 31 (noting that black illiteracy
fell from 95% in 1860 to 30% in 1910); HINE, supra note 42, at 56 (noting that black illiteracy in
Texas fell from 53.2% in 1890 to just 17.8% in 1920); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 88 tbl.3.7
(noting that black illiteracy in Mississippi dropped from roughly 50% in 1900 to around 25% in
1930); WYNES, supra note 40, at 132 (noting that black illiteracy in Virginia fell from 86% in
1870 to 45% in 1900).
118. See CELL, supra note 39, at 30-31.
119. Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 458 (quoting M. HowE, PORTRAIT OF AN INDEPENDENT:
MOORFIELD STOREY 263 (1932)).
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activity,120 because literacy enhances the chances for coordinating a
social movement,12' and because greater black literacy reduced ob-
servable differences between blacks and whites that, to some extent,
had provided the impetus for segregation. 122
Another development with implications for race relations was
transpiring in the South during the Progressive era; one might label
this the force of "modernization."123 By the second decade of the twen-
tieth century, the annual number of lynchings in the South had
dropped significantly (although racial tensions inflamed by World
War I produced a resurgence).24 On one view, the phenomenon of
lynching depended on weak social controls-a state of affairs that was
inconsistent with the forces of urbanization and industrialization that
were slowly impacting the South, as they had the North a generation
or two earlier. 25 By the end of World War I, one could find southern
politicians and newspapers vocally condemning lynching, 26 and the
South's first significant interracial organization, the Commission on
120. See MCADAM, supra note 65, at 97-98, 183-84; JACK L. WALKER, SIT-INS IN ATLANTA: A
STUDY IN NEGRO REVOLT 1-2 (1964).
121. For example, the nation's leading black newspaper, the Chicago Defender, circulated
widely in Mississippi and played a critical role in mobilizing the Great Migration. See
GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 82-88; id. at 80 ("[T]he Defender transmitted information through
the black South on a scale hitherto unknown.").
122. Thus, for example, Justice Robert Jackson's draft concurrence (never published) in
Brown observed that segregation "has outlived whatever justification it may have had." See
Jackson Draft Opinion, Brown v. Board of Educ. 1, 19-21 (March 15, 1954) (Library of Congress,
Jackson Papers, Box 184, case file: segregation cases) (on file with author). He continued:
Certainly in the 1860's and probably throughout the Nineteenth Century the Negro
population as a whole was a different people than today. Lately freed from bondage,
they had little opportunity as yet to show their capacity for education or even self-sup-
port and management.... Negro progress under segregation has been spectacular and,
tested by the pace of history, his rise is one of the swiftest and most dramatic advances
in the annals of man.
Justice Jackson thus concluded that black educational and cultural advances deprived school
segregation of that rational basis which the Equal Protection Clause requires of all state legis-
lation. I am grateful to William E. Jackson and Mary Jackson Craighill for permission to quote
from this document.
123. Again John Cell usefully cautions against the facile assumption that segregation is the
product of a rural, preindustrial, premodern society; its history in South Africa disproves this
assumption. See CELL, supra note 39, at 4-5, 133-34, 232. Yet Cell does not refute the notion
that the forces of modernity, while temporarily reconcilable with white supremacy, ultimately
sowed the seeds of its destruction.
124. See ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 6-7 tbl.2; see also BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 141
(noting that by 1910 lynchings were exceedingly rare in Virginia).
125. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 9, 70, 104, 126-27, 210-11.
126. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 208-09 (noting the governor of Georgia's celebrated
denunciation of lynching in 1919); ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 46.
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Interracial Cooperation, had been established to campaign against
it.127
Another important extralegal factor conducive to changed race
relations was World War I, though the timing of America's entrance
into the War makes it implausible to believe that this factor had any
influence on the Court's Progressive era race decisions. The "war to
make the world safe for democracy" had unmistakable ideological
connotations for race, just as had an earlier war to end slavery2s and
as would a later war against Nazi fascism.129 W.E.B. DuBois wrote in
1919: "Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the
great Jehovah we will save it in the United States of America or know
the reason why."130 Similarly, black journalist Monroe Trotter urged
that the United States focus less on making the small nations of
Europe safe for democracy and more on "making the south safe for the
Negroes."' 3' Blacks displayed a greater militancy in asserting their
rights during the War,' 32 especially those blacks wearing their na-
127. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 234; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 208; MCMILLEN, su-
pra note 42, at 313-14; ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 11. Even before the War, the Southern
Sociological Congress, founded in 1912, held interracial meetings, condemned lynching, and
called for improvements in black education and better treatment in the courts. See BRUNDAGE,
supra note 41, at 216; KELLER, supra note 70, at 259.
128. On the egalitarian ideological consequences of the Civil War, including on issues such
as black voting and desegregation of common carriers, see FONER, supra note 49, at 8-10, 27-28;
WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 81, 85 (1965); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 6 (1990); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 29-37 (1990); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR
ERA 494-97 (1988); THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 192, 200, 238; Fischel, supra note 49, at
288-89.
129. On the egalitarian ideological consequences of World War II, see MARTIN, supra note
98, at 53; AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
1942-1968, at 4 (1973); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 317; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980); Dudziak,
supra note 98, at 68-70; see also Klarman, Brown, supra note 10, at 23-27 (listing additional
sources).
Cell is right to point out that Americans managed to live with ideological dissonance for a
long time-at least since the Declaration of Independence. See CELL, supra note 39, at 249. Yet
it seems plain that, historically, this dissonance has become more difficult to endure during
wartime.
130. Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 457 (quoting CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 334 (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrando eds., 1968)).
131. William Jordan, "The Damnable Dilemma": African-American Accommodations and
Protest During World War I, 81 J. AM. HIST. 1562, 1574 (1995).
132. See LAUREN, supra note 57, at 89-90; MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 232;
ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. LOUIS, JULY 2, 1917, at 221 (1964); ZANGRANDO,
supra note 86, at 51; Gavins, supra note 107, at 270-71. William Tuttle attributes the race riots
of 1919 partially to the increased black militancy that flowed from the war. See TUTTLE, supra
note 92, at 217-22.
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tion's military uniform.133 The NAACP received a tremendous boost
from this heightened militancy, expanding its membership and open-
ing new branches in scores of southern cities."3 The War provided an
occasion for the NAACP (successfully) to urge that President Wilson
speak out against lynching 135 and (unsuccessfully) to lobby the na-
tional government to abolish Jim Crow for black servicemen on south-
ern trains.13 6 Anxious whites retaliated against this new black asser-
tiveness with a furious defense of the racial status quo. 37 One mani-
festation of this white backlash was a surge in the number of lynch-
ings between 1917 and 1919,138 an astonishing number of which in-
volved returning black soldiers still in uniform.139
As we have seen, then, a variety of forces were in motion dur-
ing the Progressive era that ultimately would have a transformative
133. See GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 178-79 (noting that returning black soldiers were
angered that racial conditions had not improved after they had voluntarily suspended their
grievances during the War to demonstrate loyalty to their country and that they were no longer
willing to tolerate the traditional harassment inflicted by southern whites upon blacks);
McMILLEN, supra note 42, at 303 (noting black servicemen invoking the notion that if they were
good enough to fight and perhaps die for their country, they were good enough to vote); TUTTLE,
supra note 92, at 215-19; Stephen H. Norwood, Bogalusa Burning: The War Against Biracial
Unionism in the Deep South, 1919, 63 J. So. HIST. 591, 611 (1997).
The Houston race riot of 1917 was a product of the struggle between black soldiers pos-
sessed of the rising expectations that the War induced and southern whites determined to
maintain the racial status quo. The leading account is ROBERT V. HAYNES, A NIGHT OF
VIOLENCE: THE HOUSTON RIOT OF 1917 (1976). For a similar conclusion, see C. Calvin Smith,
The Houston Riot of 1917, Revisited, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 85 (1991).
134. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 184, 230 (noting the explosion in the number of
NAACP branches in Virginia and Georgia during World War I); DITTMER, supra note 39, at 174
(noting that the NAACP did not take hold in Georgia until World War I); id. at 206 (noting that
several NAACP branches were organized in Georgia during the War and that NAACP member-
ship in the state increased from 700 to 3000 over an 18-month period).
135. See Jordan, supra note 131, at 1575. Civil rights protest also forced the federal gov-
ernment to establish a Colored Officers' Training Camp in Des Moines, Iowa. See HAYNES,
supra note 133, at 35-36.
136. See BARNES, supra note 43, at 17.
137. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 204 (noting a Georgia senator predicting in December
1918 that blacks returning from honorable military service would demand rights like the
suffrage and urging whites to take steps to prevent such agitation); HAYNES, supra note 133, at
65, 70, 86-87 (noting that white police officers in Houston were determined to put black soldiers
encamped near the city in their place); NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRo-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 9 (1975).
138. See TUTTLE, supra note 92, at 22; ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 35 (noting 36
lynchings in 1917, 60 in 1918, and 76 in 1919); see also BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 228 (noting
that 39 blacks were lynched in Georgia in 1918 and 1919, and "race riots broke out in cities and
towns throughout" the state).
139. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 204; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 306 (noting that at
least three of the twelve lynchings in Mississippi in 1919 were of black servicemen); WYNN,
supra note 137, at 9-10; Norwood, supra note 133, at 611 (noting at least 10 such incidents in
the deep South during or immediately after the War). The notoriously racist Senator James K.
Vardaman from Mississippi observed that "whites are opposed to putting arrogant, strutting
representatives of the black soldiery in every community." Smith, supra note 133, at 85.
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effect on American race relations. But these forces were, at most, in
their incipient stages at the time of the Court's Progressive era race
cases. Of these decisions, only Buchanan v. Warley (November 1917)
was rendered after the commencement of the Great Migration (spring
1916) and the nation's entrance into World War I (April 1917). The
internal migration of southern blacks to cities, while beginning some-
what earlier, was not sufficiently advanced by the second decade of
the century to have had any significant impact on the sociopolitical
context within which the Justices operated. When we look in the next
section at actual racial practices rather than the incipient forces for
racial change that were unleashed during this period, it becomes clear
that the background context for the Progressive era race cases was
appreciably worse than that surrounding Plessy. Thus, the civil rights
victories of the 1910s cannot be attributed to any general im-
provement in social mores regarding race; one must look elsewhere
for an explanation.
B. Actual Racial Practices
An investigation of actual racial practices during the
Progressive era can be conveniently divided into northern, southern,
and national arenas. At all three levels, we shall discover that race
relations had deteriorated further since the turn of the century and
seemed caught in an endless downward spiral. 140
We already have noted that the gradual rise in black migration
northwards that began in the 1890s had produced an increase in ra-
cial discrimination in public accommodations and burgeoning de-
mands for the introduction of racial segregation into public schools.
As black migration northwards increased in the 1900s and exploded
in the 1910s, reported instances of racial discrimination and segrega-
tion escalated. 141  Even former abolitionist enclaves such as Ohio's
140. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 452 (noting that racism during the Progressive era
"took deeper roots in American society than at any time since the Civil War").
141. See COX, supra note 92, at 167-68 (noting the first serious effort in 1908 to extend
segregation in Topeka from grade schools to junior and senior high schools, and to amend state
law in 1912-13 to permit segregation of elementary schools in smaller cities); GERBER, supra
note 48, at 257-70 (providing numerous illustrations of spreading discrimination and segrega-
tion in Ohio in the first two decades of the twentieth century); MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note
101, at 310 n.4 (noting black boycotts against the introduction of segregation into previously
integrated schools in Wichita in 1906; East Orange, New Jersey, in 1905-06; Alton, Illinois, from
1897-1908; and Oxford, Pennsylvania, in 1909); SPEAR, supra note 48, at 205-07 (Chicago);
Douglas, supra note 50, at 705-10 (noting dramatic spread of segregation during the first
decades of the twentieth century in schools in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois);
Randal M. Jelks, Making Opportunity: The Struggle Against Jim Crow in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, 1890-1927, 19 MICH. HIST. REV. 23, 27 (1993) (noting that Grand Rapids Medical
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Western Reserve began to experience racial segregation for the first
time in their history.12 A Cleveland newspaper reported in 1908 that
most of the city's better downtown restaurants and hotels had closed
their doors to blacks143 It is worth noting that although virtually all
of this public accommodations discrimination and school segregation
violated northern state statutes or constitutions, successful legal
challenges were rare and generally produced little in the way of
practical results.14 In 1913 many northern state legislatures debated
reenactment of anti-miscegenation laws that had been repealed sev-
eral decades earlier-a response to the marriage of controversial
black boxing champion Jack Johnson to a white woman. 4 5
Economic opportunities for working class northern blacks were
also contracting in the period before World War I. While industrial
opportunities for northern blacks had always been scarce (except as
strikebreakers), particular skilled jobs had been open, and indeed
occasionally had become special black preserves-such as the occupa-
tions of barber, waiter, coachman, and chef. As immigration from
eastern and southern Europe exploded in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, however, many of these jobs began going to
white immigrants.146
Blacks also suffered from the rising power of labor unions,
which generally excluded them from membership and sought to se-
cure jobs for their white members that previously had been unoffi-
College in Michigan began refusing to admit black students in 1908); Meier & Rudwick, Alton,
Illinois, supra note 53, at 394 (noting that in the wake of the Great Migration, many northern
school boards actively promoted policies of racial segregation).
The trend toward northern school segregation accelerated in the 1920s and 1930s. See
MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 312-14; Douglas, supra note 50, at 706 n.108, 707 n.109,
708.
142. See Douglas, supra note 50, at 707 (Cleveland and Columbus); id. at 706 n.105
(northern New Jersey).
143. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 261 (reporting "more than a half dozen cases of hotel
and restaurant refusals on account of race"); Douglas, supra note 50, at 701-04.
144. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 257; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 41-42, 44, 207; Douglas,
supra note 50, at 704-10, 717 (noting that school segregation spread notwithstanding northern
state laws to the contrary and that even successful legal challenges had little practical effect).
Virtually all northern states had enacted their own public accommodations laws after the
Supreme Court invalidated the 1875 Civil Rights Act in the Civil Rights Cases. See GROSSMAN,
supra note 50, ch. 3; Fischel, supra note 49, at 372-87. In addition, virtually all northern states
by the 1880s had enacted laws or constitutional provisions barring school segregation. See also
Kiarman, supra note 43, at 1904 n.58 (collecting sources).
145. See Cox, supra note 92, at 167; GERBER, supra note 48, at 269-70; KATZMAN, supra
note 52, at 92-93 n.23; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 88.
146. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 41, at 101-02; GERBER, supra note 48, at 62, 298-99, 306;
SPEAR, supra note 48, at 31, 111; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 350 & n.6; Fischel, supra
note 49, at 478-79.
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cially designated as black. 147 Race riots broke out in several northern
cities during the first decade of the twentieth century, principally as a
result of the increased competition for jobs and housing that rising
black migration from the South produced.14s These conflagrations
culminated during World War I with the deadly East St. Louis race
riot of 1917 and the Chicago riot of 1919, the latter of which was one
of more than twenty riots that broke out that year in northern cit-
ies.4 9 Northern race relations had deteriorated so badly that some
blacks began questioning their traditional commitment to integration-
ist ideals.150
Race relations in the South also continued to worsen in the two
decades following Plessy. The formal disfranchisement campaign that
began with the Mississippi constitutional convention of 1890 culmi-
nated in the first decade of the twentieth century, as Alabama, North
Carolina, Virginia, and finally Georgia moved to disfranchise blacks
through a combination of poll taxes, literacy tests, white primaries,
and other devices.",' Blacks still were voting in significant numbers
in many southern states at the time of Plessy; this was no longer the
case by 1910.152
147. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 98-100; GERBER, supra note 48, at 74-78, 302-03; SPEAR,
supra note 48, at 34-35, 159; THORNBROUGH, supra note 49, at 351-57; David E. Bernstein,
Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government Regulatory Power Against
African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 94-99 (1994) (describing how white-dominated
labor unions used the licensing process to exclude black competition in the plumbing trade in
the first decades of the twentieth century).
148. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 254 (noting race riots in three Ohio cities between 1900
and 1906); OSOFSKY, supra note 48, at 46-52 (describing the New York City race riot of 1900);
SENECHAL, supra note 92, at 2 (noting race riots in Evansville, Indiana in 1903; New York City
in 1900; Springfield, Ohio in 1904 and 1906; and Greensburg, Indiana in 1906); THORNBROUGH,
supra note 49, at 284-87 (describing the Evansville, Indiana, race riot of 1903); Meier &
Rudwick, Alton, Illinois, supra note 53, at 400 (describing Springfield, Illinois, race riot of 1908).
Senechal rejects what she calls the conventional "social strain" explanation of these race riots,
finding in Springfield, Illinois neither a sudden increase in the black population nor interracial
competition over jobs and housing. See SENECHAL, supra note 92, at 60, 109, 118.
149. For the leading accounts, see RUDWICK, supra note 132, and TUrrTLE, supra note 92.
150. See GERBER, supra note 48, at 395-96, 450-53.
151. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 209 (dating disfranchisement in North Carolina to 1899-
1900, Alabama to 1901, Virginia to 1902, and Georgia to 1908); KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 239
tbl.9.1. Texas did not adopt its poll tax until 1902. See HINE, supra note 42, at 36.
152. See, e.g., DITrMER, supra note 39, at 103 (noting that black voter registration in
Georgia dropped from 28.3% in 1904 to 4.3% in 1910); EARL LEWIS, IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS:
RACE, CLASS, AND POWER IN TWENTIETH CENTURY NORFOLK VIRGINIA 18 (1991) (noting that the
number of black voters in Norfolk, Virginia, fell from 2000 in the early 1900s to 44 in 1910);
WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER, supra note 40, at 85 (noting that disfranchisement in Louisiana
occurred between 1896 and 1904 with black registration decreasing 100-fold); Minter, supra
note 38, at 174-77 (noting the extent to which blacks still exercised political power in North
Carolina under the Fusion Movement until 1898).
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One of the first consequences of black disfranchisement was a
widening gap between government funding of black and white
schools. 153 During and after Reconstruction, southern black voters,
while unable to overcome intense white resistance to school integra-
tion, had achieved some success at ensuring a fair distribution of the
public school fund.-5 After disfranchisement, though, spending dis-
parities between black and white schools became enormous, especially
in black belt counties, where powerful white planters had the strong-
est aversion to black education. In some rural counties, the disparity
reached a ratio of ten-to-one and sometimes higher.155 Efforts were
increasingly made after the turn of the century to "segregate" the
public school fund-that is, to earmark taxes raised from white prop-
erty owners exclusively for white schools, and vice versa. 156
The first decade of the twentieth century also saw the exten-
sion of segregation into new areas of life-most notably, local
streetcar transportation. Southern streetcars generally had been
desegregated soon after the Civil War, but beginning around 1900
southern states and cities began mandating their segregation. 57 Over
strong resistance by blacks and the streetcar companies, segregation
of local transportation had swept the South by 1906. Similarly, the
Kentucky st-,tute segregating interracial Berea College was not
153. See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Progressivism-For Middle-Class Whites Only: North
Carolina Education, 1880-1910, 46 J. So. HIsT. 169, 179 (1980) (noting that after disfranchise-
ment in North Carolina the ratio of black to white educational expenditures decreased by 53%
in just 10 years). For similar results in other locales, see KELLER, supra note 70, at 253 (South
Carolina); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 80-81 (Mississippi); Carl V. Harris, Stability and
Change in Discrimination Against Black Public Schools: Birmingham, Alabama, 1871-1931, 51
J. So. HIsT. 375, 378 (1985) (rural Alabama); Robert A. Margo, Race Differences in Public School
Expenditures: Disfranchisement and School Finance in Louisiana, 1890-1910, 6 SOc. SCI. HIST.
9, 11 (1982) (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia); Edgar A. Toppin,
Walter White and the Atlanta NAACP's Fight for Equal Schools, 1916-1917, 7 HIsT. EDUC. Q. 3,
3-4 (1967) (Atlanta); see also CELL, supra note 39, at 187-88 (noting that between 1901 and 1915
public financial support for black schools in southern states declined nearly everywhere in
comparison with that for whites).
154. See RABINOWITZ, supra note 40, at 176, 178-81; Kousser, supra note 153, at 173, 178.
155. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 143; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 72-75; Schmidt I,
supra note 28, at 475; Horace Calvin Wingo, Race Relations in Georgia, 1872-1908, at 211-15
(1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University).
156. See DrTTMER, supra note 39, at 142-43; Wingo, supra note 155, at 206-08 (noting
increasing support in Georgia for dividing the school fund according to taxes contributed and the
legislature's consideration of such a proposal in 1903 as well as the gubernatorial candidates'
discussion of the issue in 1906); see also Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 476 (noting the complaint
of southern politicians that white taxes went to subsidize black education).
157. The leading source here is MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 267-306. See also
BARNES, supra note 43, at 10-11; DITMER, supra note 39, at 16-18; LEWIS, supra note 152, at
22; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 293-94; WYNES, supra note 40, at 75-76; Jennifer Roback, The
Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars, 46 J. ECON. HIsT. 893, 894
(1986).
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passed until 1904.158 A good deal of the South's most oppressive labor
legislation-emigrant agent laws, vagrancy laws, anti-enticement
laws, and contract enforcement laws-was enacted or reenacted
during the first decade of the twentieth century. 159 Residential
segregation ordinances made their first appearance in southern cities
and towns the following decade.160
While the color line was becoming more formal and pervasive
in the South during the first decades of the twentieth century, eco-
nomic opportunities for skilled black laborers were disappearing. As
in the North, occupations that had been traditionally designated
"black"-such as barbers, masons, and train firemen-were being re-
possessed by whites. 161 Again, the growing power of racially exclu-
sionary labor unions was a partial cause. 62 In the famous Georgia
race strike of 1909, unionized white railway workers struck their
employers in an effort to exclude blacks from their traditional jobs as
train firemen.163 Black lawyers also increasingly found themselves
out of work, as a more rigid color line forbade their presence alto-
gether in some courtrooms and rendered them a distinct liability to
their clients in others (because of racist judges and juries).164
Mississippi, which may have had as many as twenty-five black law-
yers in 1900, had only about five in 1935.165
Southern race relations had deteriorated so far by the
Progressive era that segregation and disfranchisement frequently
were defended, often in perfect good faith, as progressive alternatives
to racial violence, lynching, and ultimately the extinction of the black
158. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 46 (1908); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at
446.
159. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 245-46, 274-75,291.
160. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
161. See ANDERSON, supra note 102, at 230-34; DITMER, supra note 39, at 29-33, 37-38;
MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 159-60, 164-66.
162. See ANDERSON, supra note 102, at 230; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 30.
163. Two of the leading accounts are Eric Arnesen, "Like Banquo's Ghost, It Will Not
Down": The Race Question and the American Railroad Brotherhoods, 1880-1920, 99 AM. HIST.
REV. 1601 (1994), and John Michael Matthews, The Georgia Race Strike of 1909, 40 J. So. HIST.
613 (1974). See also DITTMER, supra note 39, at 33. There were other similar strikes against
black trainmen elsewhere in the South in 1909 and 1911. See Arnesen, supra, at 1624-25
(describing the struggle in Tennessee); Matthews, supra, at 629 (describing the conflict in
Texas, Cincinnati, and New Orleans).
164. See McMILLEN, supra note 42, at 168-69; MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 130
(noting that the number of black lawyers fell in every southern state between 1910 and 1940).
165. See MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 169; see also MEIER & RuDwic, supra note 101, at
130 (noting that from 1910 to 1930 the number of black lawyers in South Carolina fell from 17
to 5 and in Mississippi from 21 to 3).
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race.166 Apologists argued that disfranchisement alleviated the need
to deploy force and fraud at elections to control the black vote. 167
Segregation separated the races and thus reduced the opportunities
for interracial conflict and violence.18 Southern critics of lynching
often defended segregation and disfranchisement in precisely these
terms. 169
The developments in race relations that are most relevant to
understanding the decision-making context of the Supreme Court
probably are those occurring at the national level. The story here is
similar to what we have seen in both the North and the South. For
example, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which in the late
1880s had strictly construed the statutory language "undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or disadvantage" to require equal, if segregated,
railroad accommodations, was by 1910 deferring almost entirely to
railroad policies that were flagrantly unequal.170 Similarly, the
American Bar Association began excluding blacks from membership
in 1912. 11
The changing racial policies of the national political parties
captures well the deterioration in American race relations over time.
Many historians have noted a significant difference between the racial
policies of the first (1901-1905) and second (1905-1909) Roosevelt
Administrations. 7 2 During the former, Teddy Roosevelt conspicuously
166. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 126-27, 156, 200, 209; CELL, supra note 39, at x, 19,
171-83; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 293-94.
167. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 207; OGDEN, supra note 39, at 8; WYNES, supra note 40,
at 56, 63; Schmidt I, supra note 61, at 843 (noting that for southern progressives
"disfranchisement and electoral reform were sides of the same coin"). For a contemporaneous
statement of this view, see Poe, supra note 61, at 537-38 (justifying disfranchisement as neces-
sary to avert mob violence); id. at 541 (arguing that "the removal of the Negro question from
politics" carries away with it "the most fruitful source of bitterness between the races").
168. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 200 (noting that an Augusta newspaper urged
streetcar segregation after a violent confrontation between a black man and a white, and that
the city council quickly acted upon the suggestion); Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle:
Racial Politics During the Wilson Years, 54 WISC. MAG. HIST. 30, 34 (1970) (noting that
President Woodrow Wilson defended segregation as necessary to avoid "friction" between the
races); Kathleen L. Wolgemuth, Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation, 44 J. NEGRO HIST.
158, 163-64 (1959) (same); see also Jane Dailey, Deference and Violence in the Postbellum Urban
South: Manners and Massacres in Danville, Virginia, 63 J. So. HIST. 553, 587 (1997).
Residential segregation ordinances, such as the one invalidated in Buchanan, were defended in
precisely these terms-preserving racial peace by separating the races. See, e.g., Garrett Power,
Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L.
REV. 289, 289 (1982).
169. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 200.
170. See BARNES, supra note 43, at 13; Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 486 n.153.
17L See KELLER, supra note 70, at 259; MEIER& RUDwICK, supra note 101, at 164 n.31.
172. See DIrTMER, supra note 39, at 104; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 299-301; GERBER,
supra note 48, at 365; LEwis L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 22-24, 118-
1998] 913
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
invited black leader Booker T. Washington to the White House for
dinner-a gesture connoting social equality that was widely con-
demned in the South. The President also went to battle over black
patronage appointments to local postmasterships that encountered
fierce resistance in Mississippi and South Carolina. In his second
administration, by way of contrast, Roosevelt largely ceased appoint-
ing blacks to patronage positions in the South, remained silent in the
wake of the Atlanta race riot of 1906, declined to speak out against
black disfranchisement during his southern tour, appeared to attrib-
ute responsibility for the lynching epidemic to black rapists, and took
a hard line in defense of the military's invocation of the concept of
"group guilt" in its dismissal of three companies of black soldiers in
the infamous Brownsville incident of 1906.173
If possible, the Republican Party's position on black rights
worsened under Roosevelt's successor, William Howard Taft (1909-
1913). 174 In 1908 Taft became the first Republican presidential candi-
date to actively campaign in the South (in search of white votes).175
The little federal patronage for southern blacks awarded during the
second Roosevelt administration ceased entirely under Taft, who
consciously endeavored to broaden the party's appeal to southern
whites.176 Taft also permitted racial segregation to permeate several
government office buildings in the District of Columbia and publicly
confessed that the nation's experiment in black suffrage undertaken
with the Fifteenth Amendment had been a failure. His administra-
tion initially opposed challenging the grandfather clause in Oklahoma
for fear of alienating southern whites; that position changed only after
an insubordinate local United States Attorney forced the administra-
tion's hand. This challenge eventually led to the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the practice in Guinn.177
22, 236-44 (1991); ANN J. LANE, THE BROWNSVILLE AFFAIR: NATIONAL CRISIS AND BLACK
REACTION 104, 135 (1971); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 61-62.
173. The Brownsville affair began with a racial melee in the fall of 1906 in which 10 to 20
black soldiers stationed in Brownsville, Texas, were alleged to have gone on a rampage, killing
at least one white person. When all members of the three black companies stationed there
refused to incriminate their peers, President Roosevelt, at the army's behest, decided to dismiss
them all with dishonorable discharges. The incident attracted national attention, including
Senate hearings, and black leaders throughout the nation condemned the administration's
invocation of the concept of group guilt. The most complete account of the episode is LANE,
supra note 172; see also GOULD, supra note 172, at 236-44.
174. On Taft's racial policies, see DITTMER, supra note 39, at 94, 106-07; GERBER, supra
note 48, at 365; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 62-63.
175. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 455.
176. See KELLER, supra note 70, at 255; Sosna, supra note 168, at 31.
177. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at b51-56. Oklahoma Republicans had pressured the
local U.S. Attorney to challenge the grandfather clause, which they viewed as a partisan device
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The political nadir for race relations may have come in the
1912 presidential election and its aftermath. The Republican Party
candidate, President Taft, told southern blacks that their best friend
was southern whites, and the party platform dispensed with its ritual
invocation of the sanctity of black voting rights.178 The Progressive
Party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, reiterated Taft's advice to
blacks, while successfully opposing their seating as delegates to his
party's national convention.179 Faced with such unattractive options,
many civil rights advocates, including W.E.B. DuBois and Oswald
Garrison Villard (William Lloyd Garrison's grandson and chairman of
the board of the NAACP), actually supported a native southerner and
Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, in the presidential election that year.180
One black newspaper editor characterized the choice for black
voters-among Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson-as "three dishes of
crow."181
Wilson promised during the presidential campaign to extend to
blacks "justice executed with liberality and cordial good feeling."8 2 He
made good on that pledge by presiding over an administration that
immediately introduced racial segregation for civil servants in the
Treasury, Post Office, and Navy Departments in their working, eat-
ing, and bathroom facilities.'83 The Wilson Administration also
authorized the Civil Service Commission to begin requiring
photographs of job applicants to enable racial identification. 84
Federal patronage for blacks fell to a post-Civil War low under the
that enabled Democrats in a closely divided state to disfranchise the nine percent of the state's
population that was black (and generally voted Republican) without disfranchising illiterate
whites.
178. See Republican Platform of 1912, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 67, at
183-88.
179. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 108; FREDRICKSON, supra note 39, at 301; MCMILLEN,
supra note 42, at 63-64; William E. Leuchtenburg, Progressivism and Imperialism: The
Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916, 39 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV.
483, 499 (1952); George Mowry, The South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912, 6 J. So.
HIST. 237, 241-42 (1940).
180. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 181; OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, SEGREGATION IN
BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON 13 (1913); Sosna, supra note 168, at 32; Kathleen Long
Wolgemuth, Woodrow Wilson's Appointment Policy and the Negro, 24 J. So. HIST. 457, 457
(1958).
181. See Gavins, supra note 107, at 270 (quoting John Mitchell, Jr. of the Richmond
Planet).
182. Nancy J. Weiss, The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84
POL. SCI. Q. 61, 63 (1969) (quoting Woodrow Wilson).
183. The leading accounts are Sosna, supra note 168; Weiss, supra note 182; and
Wolgemuth, supra note 168. See also DITTMER, supra note 39, at 181; AUGUST HECKSCHER,
WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 292 (1991).
184. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 181; Sosna, supra note 168, at 33; Weiss, supra note
182, at 164; Wolgemuth, supra note 168, at 161.
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Wilson Administration, as the President refused to create friction
with southern senators such as Vardaman and Tillman, who opposed
any black federal officeholders whatsoever. 185 Southern congressmen
took advantage of the Democratic party's atypical control of the
national government to introduce a series of bills designed to
nationalize southern solutions to the race problem-segregating all
federal employees and streetcars in the District of Columbia, barring
interracial marriage (so much for states' rights!), and even repealing
the Fifteenth Amendment.1s6
This is the sociopolitical context within which the Court con-
fronted the race cases of the Progressive era. Incipient forces were at
work that ultimately would ameliorate the oppressive conditions
under which American blacks lived, yet contemporary racial practices
were in many ways worse than ever.187 The South was back "in the
saddle" for the first time since the Civil War, with control of the
presidency and the Chief Justiceship and utter domination of con-
gressional committee chairs.18  To contemporaries, there must have
appeared a realistic prospect that the racial practices of the South,
not the North, would come to dominate the nation.1 89
185. See Wolgemuth, supra note 180, at 463.
186. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 182; Sosna, supra note 168, at 35, 37; Weiss, supra
note 182, at 66.
For other examples of this "southernization" of American racial attitudes, see GERBER,
supra note 48, at 418 (noting that some Ohio blacks attributed worsening race relations in the
North to efforts by the South to nationalize its system of segregation); id. at 421 (noting that the
notoriously racist Ben Tillman of South Carolina made speaking tours of the North around
1906); KRADITOR, supra note 64, at 213 (noting a 1913 incident in which Ida Wells-Barnett was
asked not to march with the Chicago delegation of a national women's suffrage organization in
the annual suffrage parade in Washington, D.C., because southern women had refused to march
with racially integrated contingents).
Woodrow Wilson was the second Democratic President since the Civil War. During Grover
Cleveland's two administrations in the 1880s and 1890s, the South had not prevailed on race
issues nearly to the same extent. For example, significant federal patronage had continued to
flow to blacks, notwithstanding the protests of southern congressmen. See GROSSMAN, supra
note 50, at 121-41; RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESMENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 66-67
(1988); see also Wolgemuth, supra note 180, at 464 (noting that DuBois and Villard wrote open
letters to President Wilson criticizing his appointments policy and favorably contrasting
President Cleveland's willingness to appoint blacks in the face of southern senators' opposition).
187. Cf McMILLEN, supra note 42, at 302-06 (noting that World War I initiated forces that
ultimately would produce significant changes in race relations, but that these changes would
not come to fruition until after World War II).
188. See Sosna, supra note 168, at 36 (quotation); id. at 35 (noting that southerners held 11
of 13 committee chairs in the House and 12 of 14 in the Senate).
189. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 455 (noting that "[bilacks and whites alike saw in the
Wilson administration the vindication at the federal level of the South's policies toward black
people"). '
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IV. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA RACE CASES
We turn our attention now to the four (sets of) decisions that
comprise the Court's Progressive era race cases. Our goals are to
understand how civil rights victories were possible in such an inaus-
picious sociopolitical context and to assess the practical significance of
these decisions.
A. Guinn v. Oklahoma and Myers v. Anderson
The Supreme Court in Guinn and Myers invalidated grandfa-
ther clauses from Oklahoma and Annapolis, Maryland. The
Oklahoma version of the grandfather clause exempted from the
state's literacy test all persons who were qualified to vote in 1866
"under some form of government" or who were lineal descendants of
such persons.190 The undisguised purpose of this statutory provision
was to insulate illiterate whites from the disfranchising effect of a
literacy test.19' As Benno Schmidt has observed, "the approach was
not subtle, but subtlety was not thought to be required."192
How is one to understand Guinn-as a significant advance
indicative of the Court's growing commitment to racial equality or as
a minimalist constitutional interpretation that invalidated a blatant
subterfuge of the Fifteenth Amendment? Characterizing Guinn is not
difficult. The decision is notable in only two senses. First, it repre-
sents the Court's inaugural intervention against a southern disfran-
chisement scheme. Previously, the Fuller Court in Giles v. Harris had
suggested that it would not intervene in such "political" questions.193
Giles involved Alabama's disfranchisement scheme which included
both a grandfather clause and a "good character and understanding"
test designed and administered to exclude blacks from voting. The
Giles Court rejected the plaintiffs request for an injunction ordering
his registration on two grounds. First, to grant the requested relief
would make the Court "a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it
and adding another voter to its fraudulent lists."194 Second, if the
alleged conspiracy among Alabama whites to disfranchise blacks were
real, the Court would be powerless to enforce an injunction against
the scheme. Thus, the Court opined, if effective relief were to be
190. Guinn v. Oklahoma, 238 U.S. 347, 356 (1915).
191. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 836.
192. Id.
193. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
194. Id. at 486.
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granted, it must come from the political branches of the state or
federal government. 95 One could read Giles, then, as an indication of
the Court's unwillingness to intervene in any disfranchisement case.
On this view, Guinn necessarily represented a step forward.
Second, constitutional infirmities to one side, the grandfather
clause arguably was insulated from attack by the absence of a federal
statute upon which to ground the challenge.196 Reconstruction era civil
rights statutes contained several express protections for the right to
vote, but these provisions had been either invalidated by the Supreme
Court in the 1870s197 or repealed by Congress in the 1890s.118 As of
the Progressive era, all that remained of the 1870 Force Act were the
catch-all provisions forbidding conspiracies to interfere with federally-
protected rights. Strong arguments existed that these catch-all provi-
sions were intended to reach neither voting 99 nor state officials ad-
ministering state law (as opposed to violent interferences with federal
rights by private individuals).200 In rejecting substantial statutory
arguments against Guinn's prosecution, the Court can be seen as
reaching out to decide a constitutional question that would have been
easy (and perhaps appropriate) to avoid. In light of the Giles prece-
dent and the statutory interpretation difficulty in Guinn, Benno
Schmidt criticizes scholars who conclude that the outcome of the
grandfather clause challenge was "foreordained."201
195. See id. at 487-88.
196. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 388 (1915) (Lamar, J., dissenting); Schmidt
III, supra note 61, at 837-39, 870-75.
197. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (invalidating two sections of the 1870
Force Act, one criminalizing refusals of state election officials to receive ballots properly cast
and the other criminalizing interferences by private individuals with the right to vote through
force, threat, or intimidation, on the ground that neither section expressly required a racial
motivation).
198. Act of February 8, 1894, 28 Stat. 36 (1894).
199. The 1870 Force Act contained several provisions expressly protecting voting rights and
other, more open-ended provisions criminalizing conspiracies to interfere with rights protected
by the Constitution and federal law. Since the voting provisions carried less severe punish-
ments, there is a strong argument that Congress did not intend the catch-all provisions to cover
interference with voting rights. Moreover, since the Democratic Congress repealed the voting
provisions in 1894, there is also a strong argument that the catch-all provisions, even if in-
tended to cover voting when enacted, were no longer intended to do so in the 1890s. See Mosley,
238 U.S. at 389-93 (Lamar, J., dissenting); see also Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 838-41.
200. The relevant statutory provision criminalized conspiracies "to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." It plainly was addressed
toward Man-like intimidation, as demonstrated by the phraseology, "[i]f two or more persons
conspire... or ... go in disguise on the [public] highway." Guinn v. Oklahoma, 238 U.S. 347,
354 (1915); see Mosley, 238 U.S. at 392-93 (Lamar, J., dissenting); Schmidt III, supra note 61, at
839.
201. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 878 (stating that the outcome of the grandfather
clause challenge was "far from inevitable"). Schmidt also notes contemporary commentary that
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I shall consider later the Court's repeated willingness to cir-
cumvent procedural hurdles to reach the merits of Progressive era
race cases; the point is not a trivial one. As to the substantive consti-
tutional issue in Guinn and Myers, though, it seems hard to imagine a
more blatant subversion of the Fifteenth Amendment, short of a fa-
cially race-based suffrage restriction. Rather than employing a patent
racial classification, the grandfather clause used a virtually perfect
surrogate-one's status as a voter before the 1867 Reconstruction Act
enfranchised southern blacks. Of the more than 55,000 blacks resid-
ing in Oklahoma in 1900, only fifty-seven came from northern states
that had permitted blacks to vote in 1866-the relevant date under
the grandfather clause.20 2  Chief Justice White thus had little
difficulty concluding that incorporating the suffrage standards of 1866
was equivalent to nullifying the Fifteenth Amendment, which had not
been ratified until 1870.203 White noted the absence of any "serious
dispute"20 4 and proclaimed the Court's unwillingness to permit frus-
tration of the Fifteenth Amendment by "mere forms of expression."205
Nor was it necessary for Guinn to impeach the validity of
Giles. The allegation in Giles had been of a conspiracy to disfranchise
blacks using facially neutral electoral qualifications. In Guinn, how-
ever, the Court avoided any questioning of legislative or administra-
tive motive by denying the facial validity of the classification. 20 6
Moreover, the remedy sought in Guinn, unlike in Giles, did not un-
dermine the state's entire voter registration scheme, but only its
grandfather clause.207
In terms of practical consequences, moreover, the grandfather
clause cases were truly trivial. First, Oklahoma was the only south-
ern state that used a grandfather clause as a permanent feature of its
suffrage scheme.2 08 Thus the Court in Guinn was only suppressing an
viewed the decision as extraordinarily significant. See id. at 879 (noting that The Nation
deemed Guinn to be of equal significance with Dred Scott, while a writer in the North American
Review called the decision "one of the most important judgments pronounced by the Court in
fifty years").
202. See id. at 862.
203. See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 359.
204. Id. at 363.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 359-60 (noting the limited nature of the United States government's chal-
lenge to the grandfather clause).
207. See id. at 360, 366; see also Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 865 (noting how the district
court judge in Myers distinguished Giles in invalidating the Annapolis, Maryland, grandfather
clause).
208. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 852, 861.
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outlier, not challenging a prevalent southern practice. 0 9  As one
Richmond newspaper cooly observed after the ruling, the South's
grandfather clauses already had accomplished their purpose and were
no longer necessary. 210
Second, as already noted, the Court in Guinn found the grand-
father clause to be a surrogate racial classification on its face and
thus avoided any inquiry into legislative motive. In light of southern
ingenuity and intransigence, the judicial battle against Jim Crow had
little chance of success until courts became willing either to under-
take motive inquiries or to shift the constitutional focus from purpose
to effect. Guinn reflected no movement at all in this direction. Third
and relatedly, the Court explicitly noted that a literacy test divorced
from the grandfather clause posed no constitutional difficulty.211 Yet,
this conclusion gave away the ballgame. Several southern states
already had discovered that a literacy test without a grandfather
clause could be used successfully to disfranchise blacks.212 Thus a
New Orleans newspaper correctly observed that the Court's ruling
would enfranchise no blacks and was "not of the slightest political
importance in the South."213 So long as the literacy test was subject to
discretionary enforcement by voter registrars committed to preserving
white supremacy, illiterate whites would gain registration while
literate blacks would not. As late as the 1940s and 1950s, Alabama
registrars were finding black PhDs from Tuskegee to be illiterate.2 4
This problem could be solved only at the level of the system where
discretion inhered-a lesson eventually learned by Congress and
applied with extraordinary effectiveness in the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.21 5 Further, Guinn had no bearing on the numerous alternative
disfranchisement techniques employed by southern states-poll taxes,
209. For the prevalence of this model of Supreme Court constitutional decisionmaking, see
Klarman, Rethinking, supra note 10, at 16-17.
210. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 879.
211. See Guinn, 238 U.S. at 366; see also Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 898 (noting that the
Court in Guinn "took pains to protect from any implication of judicial disapproval" literacy tests
and other methods of disfranchisement). Guinn did, however, invalidate Oklahoma's literacy
test on the ground that it was not severable from the unconstitutional grandfather clause. See
238 U.S. at 367.
212. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 845 (discussing Mississippi and South Carolina); id.
at 861 (suggesting that the knowledge that other states had successfully disfranchised blacks
without a grandfather clause might explain the Wilson Administration's willingness to press
forward with Guinn).
213. See id. at 879 (quoting from the TIMES-PICAYUNE, quoted in 51 LITERACY DIGEST 200
(1915)).
214. See NORRELL, supra note 101, at 112.
215. Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 6-7, 79 Stat. 437, 439-41 (1965).
920 [Vol. 51:881
PROGRESSIVE ERA
white primaries, complex registration requirements, or criminal ex-
clusions designed to catch blacks but not whites.
The immediate consequences of Guinn in Oklahoma were, if
anything, even more trivial. The state legislature responded to the
ruling by "grandfathering" the grandfather clause. That is, under a
new statute, voters in the 1914 congressional election (when the
grandfather clause invalidated in Guinn had been in effect) were
automatically registered; all other eligible voters were given an oppor-
tunity to register between April 30 and May 11, 1916, or else suffer
perpetual disfranchisement. 216 The federal government failed to chal-
lenge this bald-faced evasion of the Supreme Court's mandate, and
the Court itself was presented with no opportunity to invalidate the
revised suffrage scheme until 1939.217 Thus Guinn had absolutely no
effect on black voter registration in Oklahoma.
B. Bailey v. Alabama and United States v. Reynolds
To understand the peonage cases of the Progressive era, it is
useful to begin with some background on the history of coerced black
labor in the South. After the Civil War and the Thirteenth
Amendment abolished the formal institution of slavery, southern
states moved quickly to enact Black Codes that perpetuated the sub-
stance, if not the form, of black bondage.218 These codes included, at
their core, mandatory contract laws backed up with vagrancy provi-
sions. A typical law required blacks to enter agricultural labor con-
tracts (usually of a year's duration) by January or run the risk of be-
ing arrested and convicted as a vagrant and compelled to work for a
planter under a criminal surety arrangement. The market for black
labor was also constricted by criminal anti-inducement laws
(forbidding employers from hiring away one another's workers), ex-
clusions from other occupations, convict lease laws, and so forth.
These Black Codes generally were invalidated by 1868 either by the
Freedmen's Bureau, military governors of southern states, or recon-
structed southern state legislatures. 219
216. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 880.
217. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (invalidating this Oklahoma law under the
Fifteenth Amendment); see also Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 880-81 (discussing Lane).
218. For descriptions of these black codes, see COHEN, supra note 41, at 28-33; FONER,
supra note 49, at 199-201; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, ch. 4; DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF
SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY ch.1 (1978); THEODORE B. WILSON, THE
BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH chs. 3, 5 (1965).
219. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 34. The point in the text requires some qualification.
Even most Republicans accepted traditional stereotypes regarding black labor and thus were
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Between Redemption and the Progressive era, though, south-
ern state legislatures reestablished a variety of legal mechanisms for
coercing black labor:220 convict labor (the chain gang),221 convict
lease,222 criminal surety laws the fodder for which was supplied by
vagrancy or petty theft prohibitions,223 contract enforcement laws,224
false pretenses laws,2 5 criminal anti-inducement laws, and prohibi-
tive taxes on emigrant labor agents.226
In Bailey v. Alabama, the Supreme Court invalidated a false
pretenses law.22 In 1885 Alabama had become the first southern
state to adopt such a law. This particular statute criminalized
entering into a labor contract with the fraudulent intent to
subsequently breach it after receiving advance payment of wages. 22
In the southern tradition, these agricultural labor contracts generally
were of long duration; they typically ran for a year and almost always
provided for some advance payment of wages. Punishing the fraud
rather than the contractual breach itself was necessary because every
southern state but one had a constitutional provision barring
imprisonment for debt.229 The Alabama Supreme Court in 1891 had
interpreted this false pretenses law to require proof that the
fraudulent intent existed upon the contract's formation. A half dozen
not averse to embracing those coercive labor practices that they deemed appropriate. See
FONER, supra note 49, at 208-09; see also NOVAK, supra note 218, ch. 2; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The
Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 650-51 (1982) [hereinafter Schmidt III.
220. The leading sources on the subject are COHEN, supra note 41; PETE DANIEL, THE
SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969 (1972); and NOVAK, supra note 218.
221. On the chain gang, which at this point in history was predominantly black, see also
Alex Lichtenstein, Good Roads and Chain Gangs in the Progressive South: "The Negro Convict
as a Slave", 59 J. SO. HIST. 85 (1993); Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 652-53.
222. On convict lease, see EDwARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH ch. 6 (1984); DITTMER, supra note 39, at
82-86; MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH, 1866-1928 (1996).
223. Under criminal surety, indigent persons convicted of minor criminal offenses would
have their fines and court costs paid by a surety in exchange for contracting to work for him;
breach of such a surety agreement was, in turn, a criminal offense, which generally would lead
to another surety contract. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
224. For example, it was a crime in Alabama to enter into a contract to cultivate lands
without providing notice that the party was currently in breach of another similar contract. See
Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120 (1904) (invalidating the law).
225. Such laws made it a crime to breach a labor contract for which one had fraudulently
accepted advance wages.
226. See David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on
Interstate Migration by African Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781 (1998).
227. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
228. The rest of this paragraph is drawn from COHEN, supra note 41, at 230-31; NOVAK,
supra note 218, at 56-60; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 651, 676-77.
229. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 38.
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southern states, including Alabama, had responded to this and other
similar judicial interpretations by adopting new false pretenses laws
in the years from 1903 to 1908. This new generation of statutes
created a presumption of fraudulent intent from the fact of the
breach. Moreover, Alabama had a rule of evidence that barred the
alleged breacher from testifying as to uncommunicated motives. The
Supreme Court in Bailey invalidated Alabama's revised false
pretenses law under the federal Peonage Act of 1867 and the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Court ruled that Alabama's statutory
scheme effectively criminalized simple contractual breaches, since
fraud was presumed from the fact of the breach, and the defendant
was barred from testifying in refutation of the presumption.230
In a similar case, United States v. Reynolds, the Court in-
validated a criminal surety statute.2 31 Such laws authorized the
hiring out of minor criminals to private parties (sureties) who paid
their fines and court costs in exchange for a contractual commitment
to perform labor at a specified rate (usually lasting for several
months) to pay off the sureties' expenses. Breach of a surety contract
was itself a criminal offense, which would usually lead to another
surety contract of longer duration. Those performing labor under
such surety agreements often had first been convicted of vagrancy or
some other misdemeanor such as petty larceny.232 Apparently it was
common for local law enforcement officers to be in cahoots with
planters and to conduct "vagrancy roundups" or otherwise
"manufacture" petty criminals during harvesting season when labor
was much in demand.23
How should one interpret Bailey and Reynolds? Benno
Schmidt calls them "the most lasting of the White Court's contribu-
tions to justice for black people, and among its greatest achieve-
ments."234 One might cite in support of this judgment the fact that
Bailey apparently was not as easy for the Justices as Guinn had been;
the decision was only five to two. Holmes, ever the majoritarian,235
230. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 234.
231. 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
232. One might be convicted and hired out for crimes as minor as use of offensive language.
For this crime, one might be fined $10 plus $25 in court costs, which together would take eight
months to work off. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at 26 n.15.
233. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 242-43; NOVAK, supra note 218, at 52-53.
234. Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 646; see also id. at 718 (calling Bailey and Reynolds
"landmarks in the slow process of exorcizing the vestiges of slavery from American law").
235. I have always been amazed at the extraordinary reputation Justice Holmes commands
among modern liberals. As far as I can tell, it is based almost entirely on his dissenting opin-
ions in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). Holmes's votes to uphold maximum hour legislation (on explicitly redistributive
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dissented because he could not understand why it should be unconsti-
tutional for a state to criminalize breach of contract. And if a state
could do so directly, how could Alabama's indirect method of accom-
plishing that result be objectionable?2 36 Holmes found this especially
puzzling in light of the majority's insistence that race was irrelevant
to the case.237 How, he asked, could one reasonably doubt a jury's
willingness to fairly apply the statutory presumption if race was as-
sumed not to be an issue? If Holmes is right, then the result in Bailey
seems dependent on the Court's recognition of the relevance of race to
the operation of Alabama's false pretenses law, which might indicate
an increased racial sensitivity on the part of the Justices.
Furthermore, the uncharacteristic failure of either Hughes for the
majority or Holmes in dissent to invoke the notion of judicial defer-
ence to legislative policy judgments (i.e., the decision to repudiate
traditional contract law doctrine) arguably suggests an implicit ac-
knowledgment of the relevance of race. 238 Finally, at least some con-
temporary commentators identified the decision as tremendously
important.239
With regard to Reynolds, one might deem it significant that
the Court rejected the argument that criminal surety laws provided a
more humane alternative to convict lease laws, which were undeni-
ably constitutional.240 In rejecting this claim, one might argue, the
Court necessarily was influenced by the actual social conditions under
grounds) and to invalidate free speech restrictions sit well with today's liberals. But the rest of
Holmes's majoritarianism should appall these people. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) (upholding law authorizing the sterilization of the mentally retarded); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dissenting from opinion invalidat-
ing a law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in schools); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (joining an opinion dissenting from the majority's
holding that a particular Philippine criminal punishment was cruel and unusual and thus
invalid under the Eighth Amendment); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (rejecting a consti-
tutional challenge to black disfranchisement).
236. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 246-47 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Lurton, J.). For a detailed discussion of whether the majority or the dissent had the better of
the contract doctrine argument, see Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 705-13.
237. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 231 (majority opinion) ("No question of a sectional character is
presented, and we may view the legislation in the same manner as if it had been enacted in New
York or in Idaho."); id. at 245 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("We all agree that this case is to be
considered and decided in the same way as if it arose in Idaho or New York.").
238. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 713-15.
239. See id. at 688-89; see also NOVAK, supra note 218, at 63 (noting that contemporary
commentator Ray Stannard Baker regarded Bailey as a second Dred Scott case); id. at 63 n.1
(noting a similar tendency in contemporary law review commentary to emphasize the decision's
significance).
240. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 138 (1914) (presenting the argument of
Alabama); Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 698 (discussing Alabama's argument).
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which these surety arrangements took place-a significant advance
over the Court's usual formalistic approach to race issues.
I find these arguments, at best, only partially persuasive.
Bailey and Reynolds are better understood, I think, as analogous to
Guinn: They represent minimalist interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment-the very least the Court could do short of acquiescing in
southern nullification of the amendment. With the exception of
Louisiana, all southern state courts agreed that simple breach of
contract could not be criminalized under the Thirteenth Amendment
or under state constitutions which (with the exception of Louisiana's)
barred imprisonment for debt.241 These state courts had, accordingly,
invalidated several contract enforcement laws that were deemed to
have the effect of criminalizing contractual breach. 242 Yet, in sub-
stance, the law invalidated in Bailey did no more. Since fraudulent
intent was presumed from the fact of breach, and the defendant's
testimony to the contrary was barred, Alabama effectively criminal-
ized breach of any labor contract where advance wages had been
paid-that is, essentially all long-term agricultural labor contracts.
Thus it was possible for the Court to invalidate the law without
mentioning the race of the defendant. 243
Reynolds required little additional creativity. Criminal surety-
ship appeared constitutionally unobjectionable-as a more humane
alternative to the (concededly constitutional) system of convict
lease-only if one ignored the patent fraud in a system that routinely
"manufactured" black criminals. Moreover, in practice the surety
system invited "an ever-turning wheel of servitude," as breach of
surety agreements resulted in new contracts of longer duration, and
convicts ended up forced to labor for periods far in excess of what the
original violation authorized. 44
Even were one inclined to discern in these decisions an indica-
tion of growing judicial receptivity toward civil rights claims, it is
important to recognize the difference between peonage and other
racial practices such as segregation and disfranchisement. A great
many people who tolerated, or even endorsed, the latter practices
241. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 674 n.104.
242. See, e.g., Toney v. State, 141 Ala. 120 (1904); State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790 (1912);
Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9 (1908); see also Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986 (D.S.C. 1907); Peonage
Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903); Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 665, 668-69, 675 n.106.
243. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 718 ("It is a sign of the times that the White Court
made its most lasting contributions to the constitutional law of race relations in two decisions
that, on the surface of their opinions, seemed to have nothing to do with race.").
244. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146-47; see id. at 150 (Holmes, J., concurring); Schmidt II, supra
note 219, at 699.
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nonetheless condemned the former.245 Southern Progressives, for
example, strongly criticized peonage as atavistic; they were embar-
rassed by it and feared that it would inhibit foreign immigration to
the South (especially since some celebrated peonage cases involved
white imnigrants).246 Indeed, the legal assault on peonage was led by
southern white Progressives, among whom were a couple of federal
district judges with impeccable southern credentials, including service
in the Confederate army. 47 Likewise, the Assistant Attorney General
appointed in 1906 to investigate and prosecute southern peonage was
a Virginian of unquestioned loyalty to southern racial practices.248
Among blacks as well, leaders such as Booker T. Washington, who
was willing to make temporary concessions to segregation and dis-
franchisement while blacks worked to better themselves economically,
fought vigorously against peonage because it obstructed black efforts
at economic advance.2 49 Peonage bore a close resemblance to slavery.
It would be mistaken to infer that a Court striking a blow against it
was on the verge of undermining other aspects of Jim Crow that en-
joyed far broader support in national opinion.2 50
Whether one regards the Court's peonage decisions as result-
ing from a newly found concern for racial justice or a minimalist
commitment to constitutionalism, it seems clear that the rulings had
little impact on the prevalence of coerced black labor in the South.
First, in at least a couple of southern states-most notably, Florida
and Georgia-the Court was openly defied by state courts and legisla-
tures that disingenuously distinguished Bailey25' and preserved for
another thirty years false pretenses laws that were essentially identi-
cal to the one invalidated by the Court.252 Yet after Reynolds in 1914,
the Court decided no other peonage cases until World War II, when it
245. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 659; Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 898 (noting "a
Progressive consensus" against peonage).
246. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 658, 718; see also id. at 671-72 (noting the Italian
ambassador in Washington, motivated by reports that labor agents in New York were sending
large numbers of immigrants to southern turpentine camps, complaining about southern peon-
age).
247. See id. at 658, 663-64.
248. See id. at 671.
249. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at ix, 65; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 659, 677.
250. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 718 ("Of the various paths away from racial injus-
tice open to the Supreme Court in the Progressive era, opposition to peonage was the least
difficult to traverse.").
251. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 138 Ga. 489, 493 (1912); 1919 Fla. Laws ch. 7917, sect. 2; see
also COHEN, supra note 41, at 190; NOVAK, supra note 218, at 64-68; Schmidt II, supra note 219,
at 689-90.
252. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 190; DANIEL, supra note 220, at 180-85; NOVAK, supra
note 218, at 78.
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finally invalidated the laws from these recalcitrant states. 253 The
analogy to Guinn seems irresistible: Supreme Court decisions cannot
accomplish much when the Justices vacate the field for decades af-
terward, enabling states to defy or evade the ruling at their pleasure.
At a time when carrying civil rights cases to the Court was difficult,
isolated victories generally bore little in the way of concrete conse-
quences.
Most southern states greeted Bailey and Reynolds with evasion
rather than defiance. 254 Several states simply reenacted false pre-
tenses laws without the objectionable presumption 2 5 and left it to
white supremacist juries-blacks were entirely excluded from south-
ern juries at this time-to determine whether black agricultural
laborers had accepted advance wages with the fraudulent intent
subsequently to breach their contracts. It is difficult to believe that
the absence of the statutory presumption affected the result in many
cases.256 The bottom line was that blacks contemplating breach of
long-term labor contracts always faced the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion.
Moreover, Bailey and Reynolds left in place many alternative
mechanisms for coercing black labor.25 7 Not only were false pretenses
laws without the statutory presumption still valid, but so were convict
labor, convict lease, vagrancy laws, anti-enticement laws,25s and anti-
labor agent laws.259 Given the capacity and inclination of officials
administering the southern legal system to manufacture black
"criminals" for convict labor and convict lease, one hardly needed
253. See, e.g., Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944);
see also NOVAK, supra note 218, at 78-83; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 690.
254. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 292-93 (noting that other southern states removed from
their books these "fake" false pretenses laws after Bailey); NOVAK, supra note 218, at 68 (noting
that most southern state courts either struck down such laws or modified them so as to be
consistent with Bailey); see also State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 780-81 (Miss. 1913) (invalidating
peonage statute); State v. Griffin, 70 S.E. 292, 294 (N.C. 1911) (same).
255. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 63-64; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 689.
256. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 64 (noting an "almost absolute certainty of conviction at
the trial court level" and little likelihood of an appeal).
257. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 648-49, 716-17.
258. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 63-64, 69, 109 n.25 (noting that Bailey did not affect the
legality of anti-enticement laws and noting cases rejecting constitutional challenges to such
laws).
259. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 238, 273 (noting that the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), rejected a constitutional challenge to an anti-labor agent law and
that numerous southern states passed such laws during the Progressive era); Bernstein, supra
note 226, at 820 n.289. There was also a good deal of harassment of labor agents seeking to
arrange emigration of southern blacks during World War I. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 271-
72; DITTMER, supra note 39, at 188-89; see also GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 44-48 (noting
illegal white efforts to block black migration during World War I); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at
272-73.
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contract enforcement laws to coerce black labor. 60 Historians of the
subject have amply documented instances of state legislatures manu-
facturing "black crimes" and of local law enforcement officials conniv-
ing with planters to manufacture black "criminals" when agricultural
labor was scarce. 261 The high visibility of the mostly-black chain gang,
moreover, provided a powerful inducement for blacks to remain as
agricultural laborers rather than risk conviction for loitering or va-
grancy.262
Furthermore, one should not neglect those instances of coerced
black labor that indulged no pretense of legality. Historians have
documented numerous instances of such practices, which closely
resembled antebellum slavery. Black laborers worked under the
shotgun, were locked up at night, and were tracked down with hunt-
ing dogs if they escaped.2 3 Ironically, such behavior violated no fed-
eral statute, because the Peonage Act covered only coerced labor for
debt.264 The chances of such activity being prosecuted under state law
at this time were remote, to say the least.
The basic point is that in an era when most southern whites
continued to believe that they had a proprietary interest in black
labor and that blacks would not work unless coerced to do so, the
Court's invalidation of a couple of peonage laws did not have much
effect. 265 Blacks prosecuted under unconstitutional state peonage
260. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 649, 716-17.
261. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 225-26, 275; DANIEL, supra note 220, at 30-32, 172; id. at
46 (noting a Justice Department investigation in relation to the Alabama Peonage Cases of 1903
which found that blacks would be convicted on trumped-up charges and given the option of
avoiding convict lease to the mines by working for a planter under a labor contract); DITTMER,
supra note 39, at 72-74 (noting specific instances of manufactured black "crimes" and
"criminals"); NOVAK, supra note 218, at 32 (noting how post-Reconstruction southern state
legislatures converted what were previously minor offenses into felonies in order to provide a
pool of labor for convict lease); Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 651 (describing findings of the
Assistant Attorney General in 1908 that convict lease in Georgia and Florida was essentially
involuntary servitude for persons who had committed no crime).
262. See Lichtenstein, supra note 221, at 93-94, 109; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 649.
263. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at 26; McMILLEN, supra note 42, at 123-27; Schmidt II,
supra note 219, at 672; id. at 717.
264. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); COHEN, supra note 41, at 279-80;
NOVAK, supra note 218, at 63, 76-77. Cohen goes so far as to suggest that prosecutions under
the federal peonage statute might have induced a reversion to more direct forms of involuntary
servitude that did not involve forced labor for debt and thus could not be reached under the
federal statute. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 285-86.
265. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at 23 (noting how hard it was to prosecute for peonage
given that many southerners saw nothing wrong with it); NOVAK, supra note 218, at 89 (noting
that as long as the stereotype of blacks being unwilling to work unless forced to do so persisted,
peonage would continue to retain significant support in the South); see also State v. Armstead,
60 So. 778, 780-81 (Miss. 1913) (sympathizing with the Mississippi legislature's "purpose of
requiring the fickle laborers in our cotton country to reasonably observe their contracts").
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laws were among the least likely defendants to command the financial
resources necessary to appeal their convictions to a court not under
the sway of local planters.266 Nor, at this date, was the NAACP or any
similar organization operating in the South that might be able to
render legal assistance. Federal intervention, in the form of prosecu-
tions under the 1867 Peonage Act, was unlikely to prove significant
since it depended on the enthusiasm of federal prosecutors, judges
and jurors, all of whom were likely to share the prevailing southern
white attitudes toward coerced black labor.267  Federal prosecutions
also generally depended on the testimony of black witnesses, who
were often under the economic and social control of white planters,
and thus not difficult to intimidate. 268 Such witnesses also were un-
likely to enjoy much credibility with southern white juries.269 In any
event, the federal government's enthusiasm for peonage prosecutions
did not last long, especially after the southern-sympathizing Wilson
Administration assumed office in 1913.270 Even in the few peonage
prosecutions that did result in convictions, judges tended to impose
exceptionally lenient sentences. 271
Leading historians of black coerced labor agree that it is diffi-
cult to know how pervasive the practice was in the South at this
time.272 But there seems to be a consensus that plenty of it remained
after Bailey and Reynolds273 and that there is little reason to believe
266. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 64; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 655.
267. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 283 (noting the difficulty of getting juries to convict in
peonage cases); DANIEL, supra note 220, at 33 (same); id. at 52-53 (noting that many federal
prosecutors were lukewarm about prosecuting peonage offenses and that sympathetic juries
often refused to convict); DITTMER, supra note 39, at 79 (noting the unwillingness of white grand
juries to indict in peonage cases); NOVAK, supra note 218, at 44 (noting that federal prosecutors
and judges avoided bringing peonage cases because they generally shared the southern consen-
sus regarding the need to coerce black labor); id. at 86 (noting the difficulty in abolishing peon-
age when juries would not convict men of practices which were prevalent in the community);
Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 654-55, 673 (noting the problem of jury nullification in peonage
prosecutions).
268. See DrrrMER, supra note 39, at 78-79.
269. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at 32.
270. See id. at 138-39; NOVAK, supra note 218, at 64, 72 (noting the quick dissipation of the
federal government's interest in prosecuting peonage and the Wilson Administration's aversion
to embarrassing southern allies); Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 648, 715 (noting that the second
Wilson Administration's concern with peonage "lapsed into apathy").
271. See DANIEL, supra note 220, at 52-64; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 663, 667-68.
272. See COHEN, supra note 41, at 24 (conceding that he, Daniel, and Novak have not been
terribly successful at calculating how much involuntary servitude there was).
273. See id. at 292 (noting a statement by a Justice Department agent early in the twenti-
eth century that one-third of the large planters in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi held
workers in peonage); DANIEL, supra note 220, at 138-40, 148 (concluding there was a great deal
of peonage in the South, even after World War I); DITTMER, supra note 39, at 77, 80-81 (noting
that peonage was widespread in Georgia); id. at 81 (noting the Attorney General's report in
1921 that peonage existed "to a shocking extent" in Georgia); see also Schmidt II, supra note
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that judicial intervention-as opposed to economic and social
changes-had any significant impact on its prevalence.274
C. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 275
In McCabe the Supreme Court was confronted with an
Oklahoma law permitting railroads to provide first class accommoda-
tions only to white (or only to black) passengers, rather than the
usual statutory requirement of separate but equal facilities. The
Justices ultimately rejected the constitutional challenge on procedural
grounds. Specifically, the plaintiffs had not requested and then been
denied the services at issue, nor had they shown that an injunction
was appropriate because of the inadequacy of a remedy at law.26 In
dicta, though, five of the nine Justices expressed an opinion on the
merits, finding that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The majority rejected the state's argument that requiring the provi-
sion of equal first class accommodations to blacks would be unreason-
able, since per capita demand for such facilities was far lower among
blacks than whites. This argument was flawed, these Justices con-
cluded, because the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed "personal"
rather than "group" rights.277  Four justices-Holmes, Lamar,
McReynolds, and White-concurred in the result without opinion. In
all likelihood, they were dissenting from the view expressed by the
majority on the merits.27 8
It is possible, I think, to view McCabe as a more significant
advance than Guinn or Bailey/Reynolds.279 First, the majority's repu-
219, at 648 (noting that the Court's decisions "left matters pretty much unchanged in the fields
and lumber camps"). But cf COHEN, supra note 41, at 297-98 (noting that the fact of the Great
Migration indicates that large numbers of blacks must not have been held in involuntary
servitude).
274. See NOVAK, supra note 218, at 64; Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 717 (noting that it
was black migration northward, intensified by the needs of World War I "that broke the wheel of
black servitude in the South"); cf COHEN, supra note 41, at 292-93 (concluding that involuntary
servitude was in decline by the time of Bailey and suggesting that, like lynching, the practice
may have been a "barbaric atavism").
275. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
276. See id. at 162-64.
277. See id. at 161.
278. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 488-91 (reaching this conclusion partly on the basis of
archival evidence and partly by deduction from these Justices' positions on other racial issues).
279. Benno Schmidt takes his characteristically balanced approach in evaluating the
significance of McCabe. He calls overstated a Harvard Law Review Note's description of the
decision as marking "'[a] new phase of the Jim Crow question,'" yet he maintains that the
ruling "captured an important shift." Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 487. Compare id. at 493
(noting that one can find in McCabe "the beginnings of corrosion in the constitutional mandate
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diation of the "per capita demand" argument in defense of Oklahoma's
law seems in tension with positions taken by the Court in the 1890s.
In 1899 the Court in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of
Education rejected a constitutional challenge to a Georgia county
school board's decision to cease funding a black high school while
continuing to provide high school education for whites.280 The board
defended its decision on the ground that the funds were better spent
educating a larger number of black children at the primary school
level. The Court rejected the constitutional challenge to this
separate-and-unequal scheme on the ground that the board's actions
had not been motivated by malice toward blacks and that it was
reasonable to redistribute existing funds within black schools in a
way that maximized the educational opportunities of the black
community as a whole. 281
In holding that separate-and-unequal was constitutional if
reasonable, the Court arguably was seizing upon an option left open
in Plessy three years earlier. It is often forgotten that Plessy did not
hold that the Constitution required that racially separate facilities be
equal; it was the Louisiana statute under review that imposed the
equality requirement, and the Court simply held that the statute
satisfied the Constitution. There was no occasion in Plessy to decide
whether separate-and-unequal could be constitutional, though lan-
guage in the opinion suggested that the Constitution required reason-
ableness, not equality.282 In McCabe Oklahoma had a reasonable
argument that railroads ought not to be required to operate largely
empty first class accommodations for blacks; that is, the per capita
demand argument surely had a factual basis. Thus the majority's
insistence in dicta that separate facilities must be equal seems to
represent a departure from Cumming and perhaps from Plessy as
well.283
for racial separation"), with id. at 494 (noting that it is also possible to read McCabe "as a
decision of rather modest significance for the future of Jim Crow").
280. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
281. For detailed background to Cumming, see generally J. Morgan Kousser, Separate But
Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J. So.
HIST. 17 (1980); see also Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 470-72 (discussing Cumming). Kousser
criticizes Justice Harlan's Cumming opinion on precisely the grounds noted in the text-that
the Court was permitting separate-and-unequal so long as it was reasonable and not maliciously
motivated. See Kousser, supra, at 38-39.
282. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 36, at 190; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 22 (1987); Schmidt I, supra note 28,
at 468-69; id. at 469-70 (noting that Plessy seemed to use a vague rule of reason in determining
what racial classifications were permissible).
283. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 493.
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Moreover, the Court's broad language regarding "personal"
rights had logical implications that, if pursued with sufficient rigor,
would doom segregation, not just the concept of separate-and-
unequal.284 Subsequent decisions would indeed invoke that language
in the course of invalidating a state scheme for financing black
graduate education out of state and judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants on land.285  If equality rights truly were
"personal"-that is, if persons were entitled to individualized
treatment rather than being categorized as members of a
group-segregation plainly was doomed. Viewed in this light, one
might deem it significant that Justice Hughes's majority opinion in
McCabe refrained from expressly endorsing Plessy, noting simply that
"there is no reason to doubt the correctness" of the lower court's
rejection of the segregation challenge on the basis of that decision.2 6
Finally, McCabe might be seen as significant because the
Court seemed to reach out to decide it. As noted above, plaintiffs
sought to enjoin enforcement of the Oklahoma statute before it went
into effect, leading the Court to dismiss the suit for a lack of stand-
ing.287 Yet rather than simply dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the
majority seemingly went out of its way to announce that the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause. It is possible that the Justices'
determination to state a view on the merits indicated a changing
attitude toward race.288
While these points cannot be dismissed out of hand, ultimately
I think it is wrong to regard McCabe as a significant departure;
rather, the decision is only slightly less minimalist than Guinn and
Bailey/Reynolds. McCabe demonstrates, as do these other decisions,
that the White Court was unwilling to legitimize the worst excesses of
Jim Crow by nullifying the Reconstruction amendments. Yet McCabe
went no further than this and in terms of practical effect was utterly
inconsequential.
284. See id. at 523 (noting that the doctrinal basis of McCabe "had potentially monumental
consequences").
285. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 & n.29 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1938); see also Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 492 (noting that
McCabe later would be treated "as a major precedent").
286. McCabe, 235 U.S. at 160. Benno Schmidt makes more of this way of dealing with
Plessy than I think justified. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 487, 493 n.165.
287. Awareness of this procedural flaw led Moorfield Storey and the NAACP to decide
against participating in the case. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 492.
288. See id. at 493 (calling the majority's reaching out to decide the case an effort "to
amplify the signal of change").
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First, McCabe in no sense threatened the constitutionality of
segregation. While Justice Hughes did not expressly reaffirm Plessy,
he did say that he had no reason to question its soundness. Moreover,
while the logic of the "personal rights" dicta doomed segregation, it is
inconceivable that the Justices intended to embrace those implica-
tions in the 1910s. The Court would sustain public school segregation
in the 1920s,289 and as late as the 1930s would affirm the permissibil-
ity of segregation in higher education so long as opportunities were
equal.290 "Personal rights" dicta notwithstanding, the Justices in 1914
were nowhere near ready to overrule Plessy.
Second, McCabe represented another instance of the suppres-
sion-of-outliers paradigm of constitutional law. Most southern state
railroad segregation laws required that separate be equal. Only
Oklahoma and three other states statutorily permitted inequality in
first class accommodations. 291 These outlier statutes should be seen
as further evidence of the deterioration of southern race
relations-segregation was no longer sufficient, but now must be
made formally unequal as well. Thus one can view the Court in
McCabe as simply holding outlier southern states to the formal norm
that all of the South had accepted a generation earlier and that most
of the South continued to adhere to during the Progressive era.
Finally, in terms of practical consequences, McCabe probably
had no effect on black accommodations on southern railroads. So long
as state law did not authorize inequality, the Constitution was satis-
fied because of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Actual conditions on southern railroads were regulated
not by the Constitution but by a combination of state common law (of
common carriers), state statutory law (generally providing that rail-
road facilities be "separate but equal"), and federal statutory regula-
tion (under the Interstate Commerce Act provision forbidding "undue
or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage"). Through the mid-1880s,
state common law challenges to unequal railroad accommodations for
blacks frequently had succeeded, 292 but these cases virtually disap-
peared after 1885. Similarly, the Interstate Commerce Commission
in the late 1880s had enforced the federal statutory nondiscrimination
289. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
290. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 337.
291. See BARNES, supra note 43, at 10.
292. See Riegel, supra note 78, at 25-27; Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were
White, and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13
LAW & HIST. REV. 261 (1995); Minter, supra note 38, at 79-83, 107-08; see also WRIGHT, supra




requirement with some rigor.293 But by the Progressive era, the tenor
of these ICC decisions had changed dramatically. While still impos-
ing a formal requirement of equality, the Commission now deferred
almost entirely to statements by southern railroads denying that
facilities were unequal.294 State court lawsuits challenging inequality
under state statutes requiring "separate but equal" facilities
apparently never were brought, for obvious reasons.295
Thus the effect of McCabe was to invalidate a handful of
southern state laws that departed from the norm of formal equality.
Where legislatures were more circumspect, railroad regulation re-
mained a matter for state common law and federal statutory regula-
tion. Well before the Progressive period, these fora had ceased offer-
ing much hope for black passengers seeking genuine equality. This
state of affairs remained fairly constant until World War II.296 Thus it
is difficult to view McCabe as the harbinger of racial change that
some commentators have portrayed it to be.297 The lesson of McCabe
for southern state legislatures was that so long as they refrained from
codifying inequality-a fairly minimalist interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment-black passengers could be subjected to
pretty much any treatment the railroads liked.
D. Buchanan v. Warley
Buchanan involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a
residential segregation ordinance from Louisville, Kentucky.298 The
293. See BARNES, supra note 43, at 13; Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 463 n.69; Minter, supra
note 38, at 112.
294. See BARNES, supra note 43, at 13-14 (noting that in all but one case decided between
1900 and 1920, the Interstate Commerce Commission ruled against black travelers complaining
about inequality in railroad accommodations, accepting the railroad company's word that it did
not discriminate); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 486 n.153 (noting that the Interstate Commerce
Commission loosened up on the equality requirement after 1909).
295. Only one state "separate but equal" railroad law was passed at a time when it plausi-
bly might have been enforced to secure equality; the others were passed mainly from 1887-1894,
by which point the political and social climate no longer was ripe for successful equality chal-
lenges. See Minter, supra note 38, at 144, 206-07 (noting that separate but equal was never the
reality). The one state law dating from an earlier period-Tennessee's 1881 stat-
ute-apparently produced no state prosecutions for railroad violations. See id. at 71-72. On the
peculiar political origins of the Tennessee law, see generally Stanley J. Folmsbee, The Origin of
the First "Jim Crow"Law, 15 J. So. HIsT. 235 (1949); Minter, supra note 38, at 63-68.
296. See Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States, 313
U.S. 80 (1941); BARNES, supra note 43, at 23, 42-43.
297. See, e.g., Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 493 (concluding for the reasons noted in the text
that "McCabe must be viewed as a significant departure in the law of race relations").
298. Several historians have investigated the background to these residential segregation
ordinances, and my account relies upon their studies. See Power, supra note 168, at 289; R.L.
Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. So. HIST. 179 (1968); George C. Wright,
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law provided that houses sold on city blocks that were majority white
(or black) could be occupied only by whites (or blacks). The first ordi-
nance of this kind had been enacted in Baltimore in 1910, and similar
laws spread like wildfire during the decade, especially in the border
states and the peripheral South.299 These ordinances were a product
of the black migration to the cities. As existing neighborhoods became
congested, black families, often middle class, sought to escape crime
and substandard housing by moving into formerly white areas.
Residential segregation ordinances were enacted in response and
were defended as necessary to preserve social peace and to protect
property values which deteriorated as racial residential patterns
destabilized. 3°° The Supreme Court invalidated the Louisville ordi-
nance on substantive due process grounds.
Should one regard Buchanan as a significant advance for the
cause of racial equality or as a minimalist constitutional interpreta-
tion? Of the four (sets of) cases considered in this Article, Buchanan
is the one most plausibly regarded as significant. Ultimately, though,
I would reject that evaluation. To the extent that Buchanan does not
lend itself to a minimalist interpretation, it should be understood as a
substantive due process/property rights case, rather than as one
fundamentally concerning race. Thus, only to the extent that one
regards laissez-faire constitutionalism as a dependable ally of the civil
rights cause-a dubious proposition3O1-does Buchanan, with its prop-
erty rights focus, represent a significant advance in the Court's race
relations jurisprudence.
As already noted, a nontrivial case can be made that Buchanan
was a significant departure. Most importantly, two recent Supreme
Court precedents had sustained racial segregation in the contexts of
The NAACP and Residential Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky, 1914-1917, 78 REG. KY. HIST.
SOC. 39 (1980); see also Lawrence 0. Christensen, Race Relations in St. Louis, 1865-1916, 78
Mo. HIsT. REV. 123, 129 (1984) (describing background to the St. Louis segregation ordinance of
1916).
299. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 13-14 (discussing Atlanta's segregation ordinance of
1913); LEWIs, supra note 152, at 69 (noting that in 1914 Virginia state officials "instructed local
municipalities to follow Baltimore's lead" and devise plans for residential segregation); CLEMENT
E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTmICTIVE
COVENANT CASES 51 (1959) (quoting from the NAACP annual report of 1917 to the effect that
these laws were "sweeping the country"); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 499-500. For a contempo-
rary categorization of the variety of these ordinances, see generally Gilbert T. Stephenson, The
Segregation of the White and Negro Races in Cities, 13 So. ATL. Q. 1 (1914).
300. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 73-74; see also LEWIS, supra note 152, at 77 (noting
residents' concern at the possibility of falling property values).
301. See infra note 323.
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railway transportation and higher education.302 If state-mandated
racial separation was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause
in some contexts, why not in others? So long as the state could gener-
ate reasonable arguments to defend racial separation in
housing-such as preserving social peace and protecting property
values303-Plessy and Berea College seemed to settle the
constitutionality of segregation.304 Indeed, the Buchanan Court failed
to distinguish these precedents convincingly.35 Thus one might
regard the decision as inconsistent with prior pronouncements and
therefore an appreciable advance. Moreover, Justice Day's opinion
for the Court featured a lengthy quotation from Strauder v. West
Virginia,3 6 which seemed to condemn racial classifications across-the-
board.37
Further, as in McCabe and Guinn, the Buchanan Court's will-
ingness to evade a potentially fatal procedural problem possibly indi-
cates an enthusiasm for the result suggestive of an emerging com-
mitment to racial justice. The actual transaction in Buchanan looked
like this: Buchanan, a white real estate agent, agreed to sell a house
on a predominantly white block to Warley, a black man who headed
the local branch of the NAACP.3 8 The contract explicitly authorized
Warley to repudiate if the sale turned out to be illegal for any reason.
Warley promptly invoked this clause on the ground that the Louisville
ordinance rendered the sale illegal. Buchanan then sued under the
302. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (higher education); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (railway transportation); see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1882) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a statute imposing more severe penalties for
interracial than intraracial cohabitation).
303. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 299, at 3. The Restatement of Property in 1940
declared that racial restrictions on the alienation of property were reasonable because of two
benefits: avoiding unpleasant racial incidents and stabilizing property values. See VOSE, supra
note 299, at 4.
304. This was the basis of the lower court decision, which had upheld the Louisville ordi-
nance. See Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472 (Ky. 1915).
305. See 245 U.S. at 79-81; see also, S.S. Field, The Constitutionality of Segregation
Ordinances, 5 VA. L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1917) (arguing that the Court in Buchanan had things
backwards, since segregation in education and transportation should be more constitutionally
problematic than segregation in housing, as only the former involves daily insult to blacks);
Rice, supra note 298, at 195-96 (noting some of the commentary criticizing Justice Day's opinion
for failing convincingly to distinguish Plessy and Berea College); Note, Constitutionality of
Segregation Ordinance, 16 MICH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1917). But see T.R. Powell, Constitutionality
of Race Segregation, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 149-51 (1918) (seeking to supply the distinction
between housing and education/transportation that was missing from the Court's opinion).
306. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
307. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 77 (quoting Strauder). Benno Schmidt emphasizes the
importance of Justice Day's use of this quotation. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 507, 520.
308. The transaction is described in Rice, supra note 298, at 185-86, and in Schmidt I, su-
pra note 28, at 498.
936 [Vol. 51:881
PROGRESSIVE ERA
contract and invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in reply to Warley's
defense based on the ordinance. Buchanan thus had all the markings
of a "friendly," nonadversarial suit, with jurisdiction barred under
Article IIIs "case or controversy" requirement.309 Indeed, Justice
Holmes initially was inclined to dismiss the suit on these grounds. 310
It is common knowledge that occasionally the Justices finesse proce-
dural hurdles when they feel strongly about the merits, so perhaps we
should regard the Court's willingness to decide Buchanan as evidence
of a burgeoning egalitarian commitment.
While these are serious arguments, I am not convinced that
Buchanan was a pathbreaking decision. First, a strong case can be
made that residential segregation ordinances represent a core viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the same way that Guinn in-
volved a core violation of the Fifteenth and Bailey/Reynolds of the
Thirteenth. While modern commentators vehemently disagree about
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment,31 a con-
sensus exists that, at a bare minimum, it was intended to supply a
constitutional basis for the 1866 Civil Rights Act.31 2 That statute pro-
vided that blacks were to enjoy the same rights as whites with regard
to property ownership, contract, court access, and protection of the
law. The 1866 Act was responsive to the Black Codes adopted by
southern states in 1865-66, some of which sought, inter alia, to ex-
clude black access to real estate ownership outside of cities and
towns. 3 3 Equality with regard to property rights, then, was at the
core of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a way that equality with re-
gard to education (Berea College) and transportation (Plessy) was not.
309. One must distinguish this procedural problem from another that was more apparent
than real. Since Buchanan, a white man, was challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance,
it was not clear that he should be permitted to raise the equal protection objection-that the law
involved discrimination against blacks. Yet certainly he was entitled to raise the objection that
the ordinance interfered with his own property rights. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 72-73 (stating
that the ordinance "directly involved and necessarily impaired" Buchanan's rights); Schmidt I,
supra note 28, at 506, 515-17.
310. See LWvA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 498-500 (1991); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 512-13 (reproducing Holmes's
draft dissent).
311. I have summarized some of this scholarship in Michael Klarman, An Interpretive
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213,235 n.95 (1991).
312. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18-19, 22-23, 163-65, 169, 173, 239 (1977); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 170 (1975); MALTZ, supra note 128, at 109, 113, 117; WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104
(1988); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13, 16-17, 46-47, 56-58 (1955); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1389, 1409 (1992).
313. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 49, at 198-200; WILSON, supra note 218, at 66, 79.
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The only sense in which Buchanan was not an obvious Fourteenth
Amendment violation, then, was in its careful (disingenuous)
provision for formal equality-whites could not purchase real estate
on majority black blocks any more than blacks could on majority
white blocks. If the Court could see past this formal equality to the
substance of what was happening314-that is, blacks were being
excluded from white neighborhoods to which they sought access-then
the Louisville ordinance represented a core violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 15
In the late twentieth century, we tend to think about equal
protection in terms of a broad presumptive rule against racial classi-
fications. But this is not how Reconstruction Republicans, with their
trifurcation of rights into the categories of civil, political, and social,
thought about race discrimination. Indeed, this was not how the
Court thought about race discrimination even as late as Brown v.
Board of Education-a case in which the Court expanded the category
of rights protected against race discrimination, rather than adopting a
broad presumptive rule against racial classifications.316 Only the post-
Brown per curiam opinions 3l7 implicitly, and McLaughlin v. Florida318
and Loving v. Virginia319 explicitly, embraced a presumptive rule
against racial classifications, regardless of the nature of the right
being impinged.320  Thus to the extent that the Fourteenth
Amendment was addressed toward ending race discrimination with
regard to the civil rights that Reconstruction Republicans identified
as fundamental-property ownership, contract, court access, and pro-
314. In Plessy, where the Court declined to pierce the veil of formal equality, property
rights were not involved. Moreover, it seems plausible that segregated railway cars could be
made materially equal in a way that segregated neighborhoods could not be.
315. Similarly, in 1890 a federal judge in California had invalidated a San Francisco ordi-
nance excluding the Chinese from Chinatown and relocating them elsewhere in the city. See In
re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890). Judge Lorenzo Sawyer thought the ordinance was an
obvious violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the issue apparently was so clear that no
appeal was taken from his decision and no other California municipality attempted to enact a
similar ordinance. See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 230-33 (1994).
316. See Klarman, supra note 311, at 226-40.
317. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (public transportation);
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (public golf courses); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches).
318. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a state law criminalizing cohabitation by unmarried
interracial couples).
319. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a state law criminalizing interracial marriage).
320. See Klarman, supra note 311, at 254-57. Professor Ortiz makes the interesting argu-
ment that even today's ostensible across-the-board presumptive ban on racial classifications
turns out, in practice, to resemble the old, particularistic approach which protected different
rights differently. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
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tection of the law-a residential segregation ordinance posed a far
easier issue for the Court than transportation or education segrega-
tion.
Viewing Buchanan as a landmark civil rights decision seems
misguided for a second reason. Even if one regards the ruling as
inconsistent with precedent and in excess of what a minimalist inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would require, it does not
necessarily follow that the Court was effecting any significant depar-
ture with regard to race. Justice Day's Buchanan opinion is a
straightforward property rights decision sounding in substantive due
process. It was issued in the midst of the Lochner era, when the
Court's commitment to protecting contract and property rights from
legislative impairment was at its zenith.321 While laissez-faire consti-
tutionalism may produce incidental benefits to the cause of civil
rights,322 it is important not to confuse the former with the latter.
That is, the relationship between laissez-faire constitutionalism and
racial justice is contingent and contextual, not necessary and univer-
sa
3 23
Considerable evidence supports this property rights interpre-
tation of Buchanan. First, the doctrinal hook for the decision is due
321. Benno Schmidt notes that most contemporary and subsequent commentators have re-
garded Buchanan as primarily a property rights decision, though he maintains that a contrary
view is defensible. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 517-22.
322. Some commentators have made a stronger claim about the linkage between laissez-
faire constitutionalism and the interests of racial minorities. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 99 (1992) ("Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics is just the right antidote to Jim Crow."); Bernstein, supra note
147; Bernstein, supra note 226, at 831-39; David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip
Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 799, 875-81 (1998);
Roback, supra note 157. Benno Schmidt makes a more complicated argument about this
relationship, but concludes that Lochner-style activism significantly contributed to the civil
rights victories of the Progressive era. Schmidt's principal points are these: (1) that Jim Crow
statutes are inconsistent with a commitment to laissez-faire, (2) that one sort of judicial
activism feeds upon another, and (3) that a "hard" conception of individual rights in the
economic sphere might have spin-off effects in other constitutional contexts. See Schmidt I, su-
pra note 28, at 456; Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 905. I find Schmidt's argument unpersuasive.
For most of American constitutional history, a strong emphasis on economic rights failed to
yield significant protection for other rights such as free speech or privacy. Conversely, since
1937 a strong commitment to protecting other rights has coexisted with a substantial eviscera-
tion of constitutional protection for economic rights.
323. Whether laissez-faire constitutionalism is more of a friend or a foe to the civil rights
cause depends entirely on one's calculation as to whether existing legislation is more likely to be
advantageous or disadvantageous to racial minorities. The same substantive due process
notions that invalidate residential segregation ordinances can be invoked to invalidate civil
rights statutes on the ground that the state should not interfere with the contractual freedom of
employers or owners of places of public accommodation. Moreover, to the extent that racial
minorities are poorer than the societal average, they arguably stand to suffer from a laissez-
faire constitutionalism that presumptively bars government redistribution of wealth.
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process, not equal protection. While Justice Day's opinion is muddled
and conclusory, its consistent theme is the importance of property
rights.324 Second, one of the Justices making up the unanimous Court
in Buchanan, James McReynolds, was never known to be an enthusi-
ast for civil rights and indeed dissented from most subsequent deci-
sions protecting them. 25 Perhaps most significantly, several southern
state courts had themselves invalidated residential segregation ordi-
nances (again, entirely on substantive due process rather than equal
protection grounds).26 It is virtually inconceivable that any southern
state court at this date would have had constitutional qualms about
public school or transportation segregation laws. Thus state court
decisions invalidating residential segregation ordinances must be
understood as evincing a commitment to property rights, not to the
civil rights of blacks generally.27
324. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74, 78-79 (1917). The NAACP had argued
the case largely in property rights terms, seeking thus to distinguish Plessy and Berea College.
See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 504-05.
325. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 901 (noting that "McReynolds's support for property
rights overcame his commitment to racial separation"); Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 519 (noting
that McReynolds's vote is less puzzling if the case is seen as a property rights one). For
McReynolds's opinions hostile to civil rights claims, see Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 353-54 (1938)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 (1932) (McReynolds, J., dissent-
ing); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). I do not mean to suggest that McReynolds
invariably rejected civil rights claims, but only that he usually did. The most prominent excep-
tions were Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927). Cf Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 571-84
(1997) (showing that the Four Horsemen were not consistently hostile to civil rights and civil
liberties claims).
326. See, e.g., State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546, 549-52 (Md. Ct. App. 1913) (invalidating a residen-
tial segregation law on substantive due process grounds while rejecting an equal protection
challenge on the basis of Plessy); Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456, 460 (Ga. 1915)
(invalidating a residential segregation law under the Due Process Clause as an interference
with property rights); see also State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338, 339 (N.C. 1914) (invalidating a
residential segregation ordinance as beyond the power of town commissioners while also raising
vested property rights objections). These state cases are summarized in Schmidt I, supra note
28, at 501-02.
Conversely, those state courts sustaining residential segregation ordinances usually did so
on Progressive, anti-Lochner grounds-that individual property rights must yield to the com-
mon good (in preserving racial peace and white property values). See Harden v. City of Atlanta,
93 S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917); Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472, 476, 477 (Ky. 1915) ("[N]o
extended discussion is necessary to establish that reasonable restraints upon the use of private
property and upon the liberty to contract are not subversive."); Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86
S.E. 139 (Va. 1915). The same is true generally of commentators criticizing Buchanan. See,
e.g., Field, supra note 305, at 83-85; Comment, Unconstitutionality of Segregation Ordinances,
27 YALE L.J. 393 (1918); Note, supra note 305, at 109.
327. One obvious objection to the interpretation propounded in the text is that the same
year the Court decided Buchanan, it appeared to overrule Lochner sub silentio in Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 521. Moreover, Buchanan's
author, Justice Day, had dissented in Lochner. See id. at 520. On the other hand, the Court
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Whether one regards Buchanan as a significant departure in
the area of race or as a minimalist constitutional interpretation (or as
something in between), it should be possible to reach agreement that
the decision's impact on residential housing patterns was ultimately
insignificant. Yet, surprisingly, some commentators have reached a
different conclusion. Benno Schmidt suggests, for example, that had
Buchanan come out the other way, the result might have been racial
apartheid in southern cities and perhaps in the southern countryside
as well. In support of this claim, Schmidt observes that cities
throughout the South were awaiting the result in Buchanan before
deciding whether to adopt their own residential segregation ordi-
nances.328 One might add as well that many southern cities, and at
least one northern one, subsequently enacted or reenacted residential
segregation laws in spite of Buchanan (most of which were quickly
invalidated in court). 29
The obvious problem with this argument is that American
cities did become racially segregated-indeed, far more segregated
than they were in 1917-notwithstanding Buchanan.330 Historians
agree that in those cities where residential segregation ordinances
were invalidated, no significant desegregation occurred331-precisely
hardly had abandoned substantive due process by 1917, and Justice Day was not a consistent
foe of the doctrine. See, e.g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (invalidating Washington's
law restricting employment agency fees); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 364 (1917) (Day, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting on substantive due process grounds the federal government's establish-
ment of a minimum wage for railroad employees).
One might also argue that since the Court rejected a takings challenge to a general zoning
ordinance a decade later, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
Buchanan should be seen as a race, rather than a property rights, case. See Schmidt I, supra
note 28, at 521. It seems likely, though, that whatever the economic merits of the distinction,
the Justices would have seen a big difference between restricting the use and the sale of land.
Benno Schmidt plausibly concludes that both the racial segregation and the property rights
components were necessary to the result in Buchanan. See id. at 521-22; see also Schmidt III,
supra note 61, at 904 ("It was the combination of a racial restriction addressed to personal
property rights of substantial importance... that produced the result in Buchanan.").
328. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 501 (noting that "cities around the country stood on
the brink of residential apartheid as the nation awaited the response of the Supreme Court"); id.
at 523 (noting that had Buchanan come out the other way, residential segregation "would surely
have swept through the cities and towns of the South and probably beyond into the country-
side"); see also Bernstein, supra note 322, at 800.
329. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930); City of Dallas v.
Liberty Annex Corp., 19 S.W. 2d 845 (Tex. Ct. 4pp. 1929); DITTMER, supra note 39, at 14; LEWIS,
supra note 152, at 77; VOSE, supra note 299, at 51-52; Emma Lou Thornbrough, Segregation in
Indiana During the Klan Era of the 1920's, 47 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 594, 598-601 (1961); see
also GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 174 (noting that the Chicago Real Estate Board in 1917
petitioned the city council to pass an ordinance prohibiting further black migration to Chicago).
330. Benno Schmidt concedes this point, see Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 522, which makes
his insistence on Buchanan's practical importance puzzling.
331. See LEWIS, supra note 152, at 78-79; WRIGHT, supra note 45, at 236; Power, supra note
168, at 314-20.
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as southern newspapers had predicted in the wake of Buchanan.332
And in northern cities where such laws had never been enacted, such
as Chicago and New York, extraordinary increases in residential
segregation took place in the 1910s and 1920s.333
This residential segregation had several causes-some plainly
attributable to public action, some to private, and some to forces that
challenge the coherence of the public/private distinction. A certain
amount of racial residential segregation was attributable to private
choice; ethnic communities have always had good reasons, in addition
to coercion and fear of violence, for congregating together.334 But, of
course, private choice cannot account for the prevalence of segregation
in the face of black efforts to exit the ghetto. Racially restrictive
covenants-held to be judicially enforceable without constitutional
constraint by virtually every court to consider the issue until Shelley
v. Kraemer335 in 19 4833 6-may have played an important role in segre-
gating the races. 37 Such covenants began to appear in significant
numbers around the same time that residential segregation laws were
first being enacted 33s In addition, formal and informal agreements
among real estate agents prevented black families from moving into
332. See, e.g., RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Nov. 6, 1917, at 4; Schmidt I, supra note 28, at
509.
333. See, e.g., GOSNELL, supra note 92, at 256-58; GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 123-26;
HOMEL, supra note 48, at 5, 30; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 14-17, 142, 145 tbl.11; see also GERBER,
supra note 48, at 289-93 (noting that notwithstanding the increased black migration of 1890-
1910, there was considerable residential integration in all Ohio cities before World War I).
334. See GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 127 (noting the ethnocentric pull of familiar institu-
tions to migrating blacks); KATZMAN, supra note 52, at 55 (discussing ties of birth, culture, and
language that stimulate ethnic congregation).
335. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
336. The Supreme Court held in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), that racially
restrictive covenants were not themselves state action, and thus could not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Court did not reach the question of whether judicial enforcement
would amount to state action. Over the next two decades, approximately 20 state supreme
courts considered the question, and they unanimously held, often relying (erroneously) on
Corrigan, that judicial enforcement of such covenants did not amount to state action; the United
States Supreme Court repeatedly denied certiorari in these cases until after World War II. See
VOSE, supra note 299, at viii, 19, 28, 156.
337. On the importance of racially restrictive covenants in the creation of segregated cities,
compare VOSE, supra note 299, at 5, 9 (emphasizing their importance); WRIGHT, supra note 45,
at 236 (suggesting their importance in segregating Louisville); Lawrence B. DeGraaf, The City
of Black Angels: Emergence of the Los Angeles Ghetto, 1890-1930, 39 PAC. HIST. REV. 323, 349
(1970) (suggesting their importance in segregating Los Angeles in the 1920s), with ARNOLD R.
HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 16, 29-30
(1983) (questioning their significance).
338. Racially restrictive covenants initially began to appear in St. Louis around 1911, see
VOSE, supra note 299, at 100, just one year after the first residential segregation ordinance was
passed in Baltimore.
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white neighborhoods. 339 City planning officials also continued unoffi-
cially to zone according to race, Buchanan notwithstanding; litigation
challenging racially motivated but facially neutral zoning decisions
generally proved futile.340 Some years later, explicitly discriminatory
federal home loan policy prevented blacks from relocating to white
neighborhoods, while at the same time encouraging white flight to the
suburbs.341
Finally, old-fashioned physical intimidation and violence
should not be discounted as a factor either. As one historian has
noted, working class whites, who felt most threatened by black com-
petition for jobs and who were most dependent upon the property
investments they had made in their houses, used force instead of
resorting to sophisticated legal devices like restrictive covenants to
maintain segregation in their neighborhoods. Historians have copi-
ously documented instances of mob violence, bombings, and other
physical harassment directed against black families daring to enter
previously all-white residential enclaves. 342 Fifty-eight bombings in
opposition to relocation efforts by black families took place in Chicago
between 1917 and 1921.343 Police forces that were overwhelmingly
white almost invariably declined to provide protection to the black
"intruders" and generally failed even to investigate the attacks.344
339. See SPEAR, supra note 48, at 26, 209-10; VOSE, supra note 299, at 66-67, 106-07, 223-
25; Power, supra note 168, at 318-19, 325.
340. See Bernstein, supra note 322, at 864-67.
341. See HIRSCH, supra note 337, at 10; KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 198-214 (1985); VOsE, supra note 299, at 225-26.
342. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 14 (noting that restrictive covenants and terrorism
were more effective than residential segregation ordinances at segregating neighborhoods in
Georgia cities); GERBER, supra note 48, at 293-94 (noting the violence that confronted more
affluent blacks trying to escape Cleveland's poorer neighbhorhoods in the 1890s); GROSSMAN,
supra note 48, at 127 (noting white resistance in Chicago to even a "respectable" black family's
resettlement in a traditionally white neighborhood); LEWIS, supra note 152, at 77-78 (noting
several incidents in the 1920s of white mobs in Norfolk, Virginia, preventing black families from
moving into white neighborhoods); SPEAR, supra note 48, at 20-22, 201, 208, 211-12, 219-20
(describing numerous such incidents in Chicago); TUTTLE, supra note 92, at 161 (noting that
"the most effective enforcer of residential segregation in Chicago was organized white resis-
tance"); WRIGHT, supra note 45, at 237 (stating that harassment included the smashing of
windows and threatening calls and letters); DeGraaf, supra note 337, at 336, 346, 348
(describing mob actions directed against blacks in white neighborhoods); cf MCMILLEN, supra
note 42, at 12-14 (noting that Mississippi did not need residential segregation ordinances
because blacks there did not dare to challenge the status quo by moving into white neighbor-
hoods).
343. See GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 174; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 211; see also TUTTLE,
supra note 92, at 159 (noting 26 bombings of isolated black residences in formerly all white
neighborhoods between 1917 and 1919).
344. See GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 178; SPEAR, supra note 48, at 212; TUTTLE, supra
note 92, at 159, 178.
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Thus Buchanan barred only formal state-mandated racial seg-
regation in housing. It had nothing to say about and no effect upon
other public and private mechanisms that accomplished the same
result with equal or perhaps even greater efficacy.
V. ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA RACE CASES
How, then, shall we assess the significance of the Progressive
era race decisions? I am persuaded by Benno Schmidt's argument
that, at a minimum, these rulings reflect an attitudinal shift on the
part of the Justices. Ironically, the principal evidence for this claim
lies not in the case results, which I believe demonstrate only a mini-
malist commitment to constitutionalism, but in the Justices' willing-
ness even to reach the merits in cases that were procedurally
flawed.345 As we have seen, three of these cases easily might have
been dismissed on procedural grounds. Buchanan had all the mark-
ings of a contrived case. Similarly, since the Justices unanimously
agreed that the lawsuit in McCabe was not ripe, they easily could
have (and arguably should have) declined to express a view on the
merits. Finally, there was a strong argument in Guinn that no fed-
eral statute authorized the criminal prosecution, whatever the consti-
tutionality of the grandfather clause. The Court's apparent eagerness
to reach the merits in these cases and render decisions favorable to
the civil rights cause seems significant, although Schmidt's conclusion
that "the Supreme Court executed a dramatic shift by its simple will-
ingness to decide" 46 perhaps is overstated.
On the merits (as opposed to the Court's willingness to reach
the merits), though, I would maintain that the Progressive era deci-
sions neither indicated a significant advance in the Justices' thinking
about race nor produced any notable changes in racial practices.
Guinn blocked a rather obvious effort to circumvent the Fifteenth
Amendment and had absolutely no ameliorative effect on southern
black disfranchisement. Bailey and Reynolds invalidated two peonage
schemes that plainly contravened the spirit of both the Thirteenth
Amendment and state constitutional prohibitions on imprisonment
345. See Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 899; see also Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 460
(noting that the Court "went out of its way to protect claims of racial justice"); id. at 487-88
(describing McCabe's importance in this sense); id. at 508 (noting contemporary commentary on
Buchanan to this effect).
346. Schmidt III, supra note 61, at 899.
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for debt; the rulings had no discernible impact on the prevalence of
coerced black labor in the South. McCabe held only that a statutory
mandate of separate-and-unequal violated the Equal Protection
Clause and in no sense undermined the constitutionality of segrega-
tion. Nor did the ruling secure actual equality for blacks on southern
railroads, since it had no bearing on railroad (as opposed to state)
policies, and the Interstate Commerce Commission was unwilling at
this time to enforce a stringent equality requirement. Finally,
Buchanan applied the Fourteenth Amendment to a core concern of its
Framers-race discrimination with regard to property rights-at a
time when the Court was most solicitous of those rights; the ruling
had no integrative effect on housing patterns owing to a host of public
and private factors pushing toward greater segregation. Overall,
therefore, it seems plausible to regard the Court's Progressive era
race decisions as minimalist constitutional interpretations with little
if any real world impact. It is an understatement to say, as Benno
Schmidt does, that the White Court "did not take the axe to the root of
the tree of legalized racism."347
In an era in which the South politically could get away with
lynching, massive black disfranchisement, the formalization of segre-
gation, and the reenactment of statutory codes for coercing black
labor, the Court stood as a barrier to the adoption of schemes that
came too near to formal nullification of the Constitution. Yet because
the Court was unwilling to question the substance-as opposed to the
form-of southern racial practices, nothing really changed for
blacks.348 Grandfather clauses were not necessary to accomplish black
disfranchisement while immunizing illiterate whites. False pretenses
laws with phony presumptions were not necessary to coerce black
labor. Statutory invitations to separate-and-unequal were not
essential to providing inferior railroad accommodations to southern
blacks. And formal residential segregation ordinances were not
needed to segregate American neighborhoods, North and South.
The Supreme Court eventually would discover that it could
begin to make a dent in the southern system of race relations known
as Jim Crow only by penetrating form to substance. Thus, over the
347. Id. at 898.
348. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 460 (conceding that none of the decisions "had much




decades the Court began to investigate legislative motives,349 question
the factual findings of southern trial courts,3 50 pierce the pub-
lic/private distinction,51 bar practices with a disparate impact even in
the absence of proof of discriminatory purpose,3 2 and generally to
question the good faith of white southerners and the panoply of de-
vices they used to subordinate blacks.353 The Court was not about to
undertake such tasks during the Progressive era. Moreover, even
after later Courts evinced greater willingness to penetrate form for
substance, their interventions had only marginal significance until
Congress followed up with more aggressive enforcement measures,
such as threats to withhold federal funds from discriminators, the
replacement of southern state voting registrars with federal ones, and
the application of antidiscrimination rules to private actors. A
Congress that could not be prompted even to pass anti-lynching legis-
lation in 1918 was not about to enlist in a judicial battle against Jim
Crow. With national race relations approaching their historical nadir,
it is unsurprising that the Progressive era Court's race decisions were
as minimalist as they were and that their concrete effects were so
trivial.
Court decisions can, of course, matter in ways other than their
practical significance. For example, while Brown v. Board of
Education had virtually no impact on southern school segregation
until after 1960, its importance to the civil rights
movement-whether in the form of energizing blacks or educating
349. See, e.g., Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating school closures in
Prince Edward County, Virginia, because of an unconstitutional motive to resist a desegregation
order).
350. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (reversing under the Due Process
Clause a criminal conviction based on a coerced confession after rejecting the state court's
finding of voluntariness); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (reversing under the Due
Process Clause a criminal conviction obtained in a mob-dominated trial after rejecting the state
court's finding that the jury had not been influenced by the mob atmosphere).
351. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants is state action); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding
that the Democratic Party's exclusion of black voters from its primaries is state action).
352. See, e.g., Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating a "freedom-of-choice"
desegregation plan on the ground that it had failed to secure integrative results).
353. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating under the First
Amendment a Virginia law prohibiting any organization to retain a lawyer in connection with
litigation to which it was not a party after taking judicial notice of "the intense resentment and
opposition of the politically dominant white community of Virginia" to the NAACP); id. at 445
(Douglas, J., concurring) (noting the legislature's "purpose to penalize the NAACP because it
promotes desegregation of the races"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating
under the First Amendment Alabama's effort to coerce production of NAACP membership lists
on the ground that "on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility").
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whites-is almost universally assumed.114 Is it possible that the
Court's Progressive era race decisions had a similar sort of
significance?35s On this view, the ability of blacks to secure court
victories was especially important at a time when the other branches
of the national government were so derelict in their duty to provide
racial justice. Since the success of a social protest movement may
depend, first of all, on its ability to convince potential participants of
its feasibility, a small ray of hope in the form of minimalist Court
victories could be a critical first step in the right direction.356
This claim regarding the symbolic or educative significance of
Court decisions is, by its nature, difficult to confirm or reject. Some
evidence exists to support this interpretation. Buchanan specifically
seems to have had an energizing impact on the NAACP, which had
played a vital role in the litigation357 (although disaggregating the
impact of Buchanan from that of World War I is impossible). The
NAACP's national membership increased after Buchanan from just
under 10,000 to roughly 45,000; locally, the Louisville branch that had
conducted the Buchanan litigation increased its membership by about
1350. 3,8 Thus, victories like Buchanan might not only have inspired
blacks to believe that the racial status quo was changeable but also
have provided concrete organizational gains to the group that became
the litigation arm of the civil rights movement.35 9
354. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown
v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152-53 (1994); Mark V. Tushnet, The Significance of
Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REv. 173, 175-77 (1994); C. Herman Pritchett, Equal
Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 869, 869 (1964).
355. This seems to be Benno Schmidt's ultimate conclusion regarding the significance of
these cases. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 445 (noting that the Progressive era race decisions
were "more symbols of hope than effective bulwarks against the racial injustice that permeated
American law"); see also Bernstein, supra note 322, at 874; Wright, supra note 298, at 50-52
(regarding Buchanan specifically).
356. See MCADAM, supra note 65, at 105-06, 111; cf Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 459
(noting that "the White Court shook the illusion that this arrangement [the existing state of
southern race relations] was permanent").
357. See WRIGHT, supra note 45, at 197-98, 238.
358. See Wright, supra note 298, at 52.
359. On the importance of the NAACP as the litigation arm of the civil rights movement,
see generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994);
TUSHNET, supra note 282; VOSE, supra note 299. The NAACP's contributions to the civil rights
movement were both crucial and varied. The organization afforded free legal assistance to civil
rights claimants lacking the financial resources to raise their claims independently, educated
blacks about their legal rights, performed an insurance function for litigants facing economic
retaliation by challenging the racial status quo, and publicized black mistreatment (e.g., by
investigating lynchings) at a time when it would have been too dangerous for individuals to take
on such a task. On the last point, see BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 232-34; see also HINE, supra
note 42, at 46 (noting that an NAACP officer sent to Longoiew, Texas, in 1919 to investigate a
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While the symbolism of these decisions may have advanced the
civil rights cause, one should not ignore two possible countervailing
effects. First, judicial victories may have had the insidious conse-
quence of legitimizing an unjust status quo. One can imagine two
ways in which this might happen. Much as the Justices' invalidation
of a practice stamps it with their disapproval, so the Court's implicit
or explicit validation of a different practice lends it a veneer of legiti-
macy. 60 Thus, for example, while Guinn condemned grandfather
clauses, it explicitly endorsed literacy tests. It is hard to see why the
symbolic or educational effect of Court decisions would run only in one
direction. If what the Court condemns is delegitimized, then what it
approves, implicitly or explicitly, is legitimized. Second, when the
Court purports to solve a constitutional problem, but the underlying
grievance remains unredressed, it is plausible that the legitimacy of
that grievance is diminished. Mike Seidman has suggested that
landmark decisions such as Brown and Miranda may have had this
effect.36 - For example, Brown defined the Equal Protection problem to
be one of de jure segregation; if, after Brown, formally desegregated
black schools remained unequal, this could not, by definition, be at-
tributable to any constitutional flaw.362 Similarly, if residential segre-
gation persisted after the Court invalidated segregation ordinances in
Buchanan, this could not be because of any constitutional vice, and
thus the legitimacy of the grievance arguably was undercut.
Judicial victories may have a second, more concrete deleterious
effect: They may persuade participants in a social protest movement
to devote additional energy and resources to the path that has proven
successful-namely, litigation. Yet it has become commonplace
among legal academics and political scientists in the 1990s to
question the ability of courts acting alone to produce significant social
change.3 63 Much of the agenda of the modem civil rights movement
probably was beyond the capacity of courts to deliver in two senses.
First, conventional doctrinal tools would not permit a court, for
example, to pierce the public/private distinction in the way that a
race riot was severely beaten, and the state's governor responded to NAACP protests by
blaming northern interventionists who stirred up trouble with southern race relations).
360. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1729, 1732 (1997) (arguing that our need to believe that the
Constitution is "a basically good and just document" leads us to treat grievances not plausibly
addressed by that document as "not seriously and profoundly great injustices").
361. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
362. See id. at 717.
363. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 19; Friedman, supra note 19; Klarman,
Rethinking, supra note 10; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990).
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legislature could. Thus, the Supreme Court was unwilling to give the
sit-in demonstrators of the 1960s what they wanted-a
pronouncement that it was unconstitutional for the state to prosecute
demonstrators protesting racial segregation in public accommodations
for trespass or breach of the peace.364 Congress, of course, not only
could but ultimately did supply a federally-protected right of access to
public accommodations in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Similarly, the
Court lacked the doctrinal tools to declare private employment
discrimination unconstitutional, while Congress plainly possessed
constitutional power, under the Commerce Clause if not Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to make it illegal.
Second, even litigation victories that were within the reach of
conventional doctrine generally meant little in practical terms until
Congress supplied effective enforcement mechanisms. Thus, Brown's
invalidation of de jure segregation had little impact until Congress in
1964 authorized the withholding of federal educational funds from
school districts maintaining segregation. 365 Similarly, neither the
Fifteenth Amendment nor Court decisions implementing it meant
much in the deep South until Congress in 1965 appointed federal
voting registrars to ensure nondiscriminatory registration of black
voters.366  To the extent that court victories might have induced a
diversion of scarce resources from political mobilization to litigation,
one might question how well they served the long-term interests of
the civil rights movement.
While I am generally persuaded by this line of analysis, one
important qualification is necessary. Civil rights litigation may have
been important not simply in terms of the results it
achieved-whether concrete or symbolic-but also as part of a process
for mobilizing group consciousness. 367 It is clear that by the 1930s
some NAACP leaders entertained precisely this view of litigation.
364. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (ducking the state action question and
remanding the case to state court on other grounds). Bell was the culmination of several years
worth of evasions, as the Justices consistently found legal bases for reversing the convictions of
sit-in demonstrators, while declining to resolve the state action issue. For a brief history of the
Court's internal deliberations on these cases, see Klarman, supra note 311, at 272-76.
365. See ROSENBERG, supra note 19, at 50, 97-100; see also STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE
LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT ch. 3 (1995).
366. See DAVID J. GARROw, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 19 tbl.1-3, 189 tbl.6-1 (1978).
367. Mark Tushnet hints at, but does not develop, this interpretation in his biography of
Thurgood Marshall. See TUSHNET, supra note 359, at vi; cf ZANGRANDO, supra note 86, at 38
(noting that the NAACP's political campaign against lynching was as important for its indirect
effect of stimulating broader struggles for racial justice as for its direct effect, since no anti-
lynching legislation ever was secured).
1998] 949
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The Margold Report, which in 1930 formulated an overall NAACP
litigation strategy, stressed that litigation would "stir... the spirit of
revolt among blacks" and cause whites to view them with greater
respect. 6 8  A memorandum by Special Counsel Charles Houston in
1934 warned that "isolated suits mean little unless the communities
and persons affected believe there is an unexpended reserve available
to maintain a persistent struggle" and declared that a principal
objective of the litigation campaign should be "to arouse and
strengthen the will of local communities to demand and fight for their
rights."3 69 Jack Greenberg, in his recent memoir of his years with the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (1949-1984), describes how litigation
efforts in local communities could "provide[ ] branch-building and
fund-raising vehicles."370 Indeed, several NAACP branches apparently
were formed specifically to challenge the racial segregation
ordinances that ultimately were invalidated in Buchanan 711
Professor Mark Tushnet in his recent biography relates how Thurgood
Marshall frequently was conscripted into making public speeches at
mass rallies after journeying to local southern communities for a court
appearance. "On occasion," Tushnet observes, Marshall "appears to
have been brought to town nominally to work on pending litigation
but actually to rally the troops."372 Furthermore, for local blacks to
observe a skilled black lawyer subjecting the white county sheriff to a
grueling cross-examination may have accelerated the emergence of
their civil rights consciousness3 73  As Tushnet notes, perhaps
Marshall's most important audience on such occasions was neither
judge nor jury, but rather "the African-American community
observing the trial."374 It is possible, then, that the principal
368. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 59 (1994); accord id. at 212, 511-12.
369. Memorandum from Charles Houston to Joint Committee of NAACP and the American
Fund for Public Service 1-2 (Oct. 24, 1934) (NAACP Papers, microfilm collection, Part III, series
A, reel 1, frames 859-60); see also CELL, supra note 39, at 15 (citing DuBois and Biko for the
view that the first and most crucial stage of the freedom struggle is liberating victims from the
oppression existing in their own minds); id. at 240-41 (noting that one of the obstacles the civil
rights movement had to overcome was the tendency of southern blacks to internalize deference
and subordination to whites as a way of guarding against temporary lapses that could have
deadly consequences).
370. GREENBERG, supra note 368, at 102; see id. at 511-12 (noting that the Legal Defense
Fund's efforts stirred "the 'spirit of revolt' among black people").
371. See Schmidt I, supra note 28, at 503, 514 (noting that the Baltimore and Louisville
branches were organized in order to challenge segregation ordinances).
372. TUSHNET, supra note 359, at 30.
373. See id. at 62-63. On contemporary perceptions of the importance to the black com-
munity of seeing black lawyers arguing civil rights cases, see MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note
101, at 149-52.
374. TUSHNET, supra note 359, at 66.
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significance of the Progressive era race cases was neither the concrete
legal change they produced (which was relatively trivial) nor the
symbolic effect of civil rights victories (which was a double-edged
sword), but rather the vehicle they provided for the incipient
mobilization of a black protest movement.
Particularly at a time when street protests might not have
been practicable, owing both to the dearth of participants and the
related likelihood of violent resistance, 375 it was vital that blacks be
able to voice their protests somehow. Litigation did not require mass
participation to succeed, and it offered a relatively safe venue for
challenging the racial status quo. Viewed from this perspective, it is
useful to reconsider where the Progressive era race cases came from
and what sort of lawsuits they involved. Guinn and McCabe both
were from Oklahoma; Buchanan was from Kentucky; Myers v.
Anderson, a companion case to Guinn, was from Maryland. These
were border states that had institutionalized Jim Crow but nowhere
near as high black population percentages as the southern states and
nowhere near as antediluvian race relations. The only race cases of
the Progressive era that issued from the real South were Bailey and
Reynolds. The latter involved a federal government prosecution of a
white man for peonage. Only Bailey involved a black litigant chal-
lenging racial practices in the South (Alabama), and he enjoyed sig-
nificant white financial and legal assistance, including that provided
by a federal judge.376 Peonage, it should be recalled, was opposed by
Progressives in the South as well as the North.
That blacks outside of the border states failed to bring legal
challenges to Jim Crow during this period suggests how utterly incon-
ceivable street protests would have been. It is no accident that the
only significant direct action protests of this period-the streetcar
boycotts of 1900-06-assumed a nonconfrontational form that insu-
lated the protestors from retaliation.377 In the rural deep South at
375. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 41, at 204 (noting that the "pervasiveness of white violence
and white scrutiny of black conduct" in rural Georgia around the turn of the century relegated
blacks to "furtive means" of condemning lynching); DIrrTMER, supra note 39, at 22 (noting that
blacks' efforts to change the "caste system" were limited by "the very system they were fight-
ing"); MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at 285-88 (noting that no civil rights movement was possible in
Mississippi at this time); MEIER & RuDwICK, supra note 101, at 348 (noting sociologist E.
Franklin Frazier predicting that Gandhi's form of nonviolent resistance would lead to a massa-
cre of defenseless blacks in the South).
376. See Schmidt II, supra note 219, at 677.
377. See MEIER & RuDWICK, supra note 101, at 279, 309-10; MCMILLEN, supra note 42, at
294; see also MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 101, at 348 (noting that as late as World War II
southern blacks considered it too dangerous to protest railroad segregation by entering white
coaches and waiting rooms, and thus chose instead to boycott offending railroad lines). It is also
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this time, merely establishing an NAACP branch was putting one's
life in jeopardy318 It is possible, then, to regard the courtroom as the
only feasible arena for civil rights protest in an era when blacks were
still lynched for expressing dissatisfaction with the racial status quo.
Whether litigation resulted in Supreme Court victories or not, it
represented one of the few forums in which black protest could, with
relative safety, take place during the Progressive era.
notable that the streetcar boycotts were a conservative protest movement, in the sense that they
sought to preserve the status quo, not to change it. For discussion of the more subtle, private
acts of black resistance that characterized everyday life in the Jim Crow South, see Robin D.G.
Kelley, "We Are Not What We Seem": Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the Jim
Crow South, 80 J. AM. HIST. 75 (1993).
378. See DITTMER, supra note 39, at 206 (noting that smaller Georgia towns would not
tolerate an NAACP branch and that one had to be disbanded in Thomasville in 1920 after
whites threatened to kill its president); McMILLEN, supra note 42, at 314-16 (noting that the
establishment of NAACP branches in Mississippi, unlike in Atlanta or Birmingham, simply was
not conceivable at this time, owing to the threat of retaliatory violence by whites).
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